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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 FUGGER, ERICA American Aid for German War Prisoners:  
  Humanitarian Relief as Reconciliation between Heritage and Patriotism 
 
 ADVISOR: Andrew Morris 
 
 
 When Europe was thrown into conflict in 1939, German Americans feared 
treatment reminiscent of the discriminatory practices of World War I. Recent immigrants 
were in an especially difficult position, as they sought to remain loyal to their adopted 
country, while also desiring to assist those affected by the war abroad. In answer to this 
dilemma, Emil Auer, a native of Munich and naturalized resident of Buffalo, New York, 
formed a war relief organization in 1940. Initially focusing its efforts on the British 
Commonwealth camps established in Canada, the American Aid for German War 
Prisoners grew to assist Axis soldiers and internees imprisoned worldwide.  
 Closely scrutinized by the government before and after American entrance into 
the war, the group emphasized its humanitarian intentions to preempt disapproval. 
Nevertheless, the President’s War Relief Control Board pursued a campaign of 
consolidation among philanthropic organizations, and revoked Auer’s permit in 1943. 
However, the American Aid for German War Prisoners reflected a growing tolerance for 
German Americans, as the effort came to signify the reemergence and greater acceptance 
of a cohesive ethnic community. 
 This thesis traces the progress of the relief organization through its rise, 
expansion, investigation, and dissolution. Research draws upon government documents, 
American Aid for German War Prisoners ii 
association newsletters, and personal correspondences housed in the New York State 
Library in Albany, New York City Public Library, and National Archives in College 
Park, Maryland. Most notably, this work reflects upon the evolution of the German 
American community through a humanitarian effort that concurrently supported both 
German heritage and American patriotism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
  “When you are behind barbed wire, cut off from the world, it are these signs of 
compassion and caring that make your fate bearable.”1 
 
    — Gustav Pohlig, World War II Prisoner of War, German Army 
 
 
  In September 1940, Emil Auer petitioned the U.S. Department of State for 
permission to establish a war relief organization. While humanitarian work itself was not 
rare during the Second World War, the focus of Auer’s effort was particularly unusual. 
Strikingly, the “American Aid for German War Prisoners” sought to bring relief to 
captured Axis servicemen. Existent neutrality agreements allowed American 
philanthropy to subsist with little regulation, as the United States continued to refrain 
from involvement in the European conflict. Nevertheless, the focus of Auer’s group 
appeared to challenge the very core of American sensibilities. 
 As tension escalated overseas, the British relocated their prisoners of war (POWs) 
to the country’s distant dominions. Canadian detention camps came to house captured 
German servicemen and brought the prospects of warfare nearer to the American home 
front. Without the legal ability to prohibit the organization’s founding, the federal 
government granted the American Aid for German War Prisoners consent to engage in 
donation collection on the soldiers’ behalf. Growing in scope over the next three years, 
the relief effort expanded to include German, Italian, and occasionally, U.S. prisoners of 
                                                        
 1. Thomas R. Nealeigh, “The ‘American Aid for German War Prisoners’ CARD,” German Postal 
Specialist (November 1981), 477. 
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war internationally. It extended further aid to civilian internees upon America’s entrance 
into World War II.  
 The greatest support for the relief effort was derived from German Americans 
nationwide. Yet, the American Aid was established amid a time of great uncertainly for 
the ethnic community. German Americans were only slowly recovering from the World 
War I era “anti-German hysteria” that had fueled discrimination and induced their rapid 
assimilation. As a result, recent immigrants during the interwar years often sought 
unification focused on their heritage and culture. The more radical groups of the time 
were largely rejected as the majority of German Americans sought to portray neutral 
rather than political alliances. Therefore, humanitarian initiatives like the American Aid 
organization became the common ground upon which German Americans could 
congregate. Since global philanthropy was accepted during times of war, the relief effort 
could exist without the threat of persecution.  
 As a first-generation German American, Emil Auer remained adamantly loyal to 
the United States, but also maintained ties to his homeland. He further sought to express 
support for his heritage and hoped to unify a divided ethnic community. Auer’s religious 
roots as a Quaker also likely encouraged his humane pursuit of war relief. Others 
involved in the organization occasionally even possessed familial ties to the POWs 
themselves. Each of these factors culminated in the founding of the American Aid for 
German War Prisoners. While essentially existing on a small scale, this group brought the 
prisoners and internees necessities and desired comforts. Providing small items and care 
packages, the organization existed without the purpose of aiding the Nazi government, 
but rather with the intention of providing aid to those most affected by the perils of war.  
American Aid for German War Prisoners 
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 It was therefore a curious combination of factors that led to the demise of Emil 
Auer’s association. After American involvement commenced overseas, war relief 
jurisdiction was transferred from the State Department to the President’s War Relief 
Control Board (WRCB). The Board was given the task of decreasing the number of relief 
efforts present in the United States. Intending to minimize competition and duplication, 
the WRCB pursued a campaign of consolidation that saw local initiatives replaced by 
those recognized internationally. Consequently, the Board became particularly weary of 
Auer’s continuous pursuits of expansion. Inquiries into his past alliances fueled 
investigations of the effort’s true purpose. Discoveries of Auer’s youthful ties to Nazism 
in Germany provided the final grounds of disbanding the organization. Despite innocent 
intentions, the American Aid ceased to exist in 1943. 
 Overall, this thesis examines the conditions allowing for the formation and 
decline of the American Aid for German War Prisoners. It suggests a narrative to the 
largely untold story of German American war relief through archival research and 
secondary analysis. Essentially, it will seek to present this humanitarian involvement as 
an outlet for reconciliation between ethnic heritage and American patriotism.  
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CHAPTER 1. 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
 
 American philanthropy during the Second War World has been chronicled 
through the analysis of international relief organizations. But seldom has research been 
completed on local humanitarian initiatives like the American Aid for German War 
Prisoners. As there exists little writing immediately on the subject, it is especially 
important to examine the societal circumstances that influenced the tenure of this 
organization. Insight into the group’s formation and demise will consider the treatment, 
perception, and collective identity of the German American community. An evaluation of 
ethnic associations like the American Aid for German War Prisoners is need to lend a 
broader perspective to Auer’s initiative. Furthermore, it is essential to examine the 
conditions present in both the Allied POW camps and American internment operations to 
gain an understanding of the individuals Auer aided. An appraisal of these subjects 
allows for a wider analysis of the war relief’s place within the context of the Second 
World War and amid the greater German American experience. 
 
The American Aid for German War Prisoners 
 While Emil Auer’s efforts have not previously appeared in scholarly publications, 
lesser known periodicals reveal evidence of his group’s impact. The Germany Philatelic 
Society, an association of postal stamp collectors based in the United States, printed two 
American Aid for German War Prisoners 
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articles on the relief organization in their monthly magazine. As Auer was a stamp dealer 
by trade, mention of his wartime efforts was relevant to the German Postal Specialist.  
 The 1981 edition of the Specialist included what appears to be the most 
comprehensive writing on the American Aid for German War Prisoners. Although the 
article was not published with scholarly intent, Thomas Nealeigh incorporated his 
personal correspondences with Auer and former German POWs as primary source 
evidence. Nealeigh wrote that the relief group sent 200,000 parcels to prisoner of war 
camps worldwide, and that the donations primarily consisted of small articles like 
cigarettes and toothbrushes. He noted that the organization’s fundraising efforts included 
the sale of “War Cards” containing German stamps, but clarified that the initiative was 
not formed with “sinister” intent.1 This article must be understood as a nonacademic 
source, but should be recognized for its merit in conveying Auer’s direct perspective. 
 The German Postal Specialist published a second piece on the American Aid for 
German War Prisoners in 2008. Myron Fox derived the majority of his research from 
Nealeigh’s descriptions of the relief effort, but also drew upon his own communications 
with Auer after the war’s conclusion. It initially appears that the absence of primary 
source material minimizes the effectiveness of his argument. Fox asserted, “The relief 
done by Auer and his organization was not without notice in Germany. The German 
treatment of American POWs was given some preferential status as a result.”2 Although 
the group’s immediate impact on the German prisoners of war is confirmed through the 
soldiers’ writings, the expansive claims made in Fox’s article are less readily verified. It 
                                                        
 1. Nealeigh, “CARD,” 477. 
 2. Myron Fox, “American Aid for German War Prisoners,” German Postal Specialist 59, no. 8 
(August 2008), 328.   
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is not likely that the German government would have been regularly informed of such a 
small-scale operation, and still less probable that these efforts would have had an 
immense impact on American POW treatment.  
 Yet, Auer’s collaboration with the International Red Cross may have ensured that 
Germany was in fact advised of his efforts. It is possible that Fox based his claims on the 
assumption that both the German Red Cross and national government would have 
subsequently been privy to information regarding the war relief group. A further review 
of Fox’s personal correspondences reveals that Auer himself issued the original 
statement, although without direct evidence supporting his assertions.3 While this article 
lends insight into the greater influence of the American Aid for German War Prisoners, 
the source is still not one of an academic nature. As a result, caution will be used when 
citing its contents.  
 One further piece was published in Germany by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
Zensupost e.V in the AGZ Rundbrief.4 The author, Gustav Pohlig, was a former German 
POW detained in Australia who benefited from the work of Auer’s group.5 He stated that 
the American Aid organization brought relief to 100,000 prisoners worldwide and that its 
fundraising techniques also extended to the sale of traditional German flowers. Pohlig 
quoted Auer as having emphasized the integrity with which his group functioned, 
“Niemals haben wir nach Nationalität, Religion oder Rasse gefragt – wir halfen allen. 
Das war unsere Stärk [Never did we ask about nationality, religion or race – we helped 
                                                        
 3. Emil Auer, letter to Myron Fox, September 30, 1965. 
 4. The Arbeitsgemeinschaft Zensupost e.V. is a recognized German association specializing in the 
investigation of postal censorship.  
 5. Nealeigh, “CARD,” 477-478.  
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everyone. That was our strength].”6 The author likened this charitable cause and idealism 
to Auer’s ties with the Quaker religion. Although this piece was also not published with 
academic intent, Pohlig’s writings can be used to further contextualize Auer’s work.  
 Despite the scarcity of scholarly writing on the subject, each article presents a 
further means of analysis and background on the American Aid for German War 
Prisoners. While these writings will be used with discretion, they serve the useful purpose 
of lending insight into Auer’s direct perspective on his war relief initiative.  
 
Before the Second War: Identity and Persecution  
 At the advent of World War I, the German American community was well 
established among the greater populace.7 Embracing the cultural pluralism of American 
society, German immigrants commonly pursued U.S. citizenship while maintaining an 
emphasis on their cultural identity. The group sought to pursue involvement in policy and 
government, while dually intending to preserve a sense of ethnic distinction and heritage. 
With immigration reaching its peak near the dawn of the twentieth century, German 
Americans had come to play a vital role in American society.8 
 Therefore, the “anti-German hysteria” that emerged during the First World War 
was largely unprecedented. Don Tolzmann argued that public prejudice grew to deprive 
German Americans of their proud cultural element. Criticisms of German language 
practice struck the very core of the immigrants’ heritage and challenged the community’s                                                         
 6. Gustav A. Pohlig, “Die Amerikanische Hilfsaktion für Kriegsgefangene [American Relief Work 
for Prisoners of War],” AGZ Rundbrief 43/84 (1984): 135-138. 
      7. Don Heinrich Tolzmann, The German-American Experience (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 
2000), 235-236.  
 8. Tolzmann, Experience, 272, 243, 224; Russell Kazal, Becoming Old Stock: The Paradox of 
German-American Identity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 8. 
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cohesiveness. Ethnic slurs developed into more aggressive harassment and expanded to 
include coerced readings of the Pledge of Allegiance to reinforce American loyalty.9  
 The scope of these practices also extended to direct governmental legislation. 
Frederick Luebke described the mandated persecution of German Americans through 
policy and law. Encouraged by the developing wartime fervor, the U.S. government 
admonished both German influence and culture. Federal regulations transformed 
American patriotism into “rampant prejudice,” spawning campaigns to rid street names 
and monuments of German distinction.10 Most drastically, residents who had acquired 
German citizenship were regularly interned as “enemy aliens.” Such actions served as a 
means of intimidation, and complemented efforts to target and dismantle German 
American associations.11 Each of these efforts further fractured the bonds of the ethnic 
community.  
 From the perspectives of those historians, it is understood that a combination of 
both public panic and federal mandate detrimentally affected German Americans during 
the First World War. The immigrants became synonymous with the conflict overseas 
rather than being known their conduct within the boundaries of the United States. As a 
result, by the end of the war, the group no longer sought such prominent positions in 
American society. Instead, self-censorship was encouraged through adaption and 
naturalization in an effort to hide most indications of German heritage.12 
 This departure from ethnic identification continued into the interwar period as the 
lingering effects of the discrimination persisted. Russell Kazal gave example of                                                         
 9. Tolzmann, Experience, 287. 284, 299.    
 10. Frederick C. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty: German Americans and World War I (DeKalb, 
Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974), 268. 
  11. Tolzmann, Experience, 283, 286. 
 12. Luebke, Bonds, 282.  
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Philadelphia’s German American community as a paradoxical reflection of “how the 
nation’s largest ethnic group ha[d] gone missing from the national scene.”13 He further 
suggested that a strict sense of ethnic distinction was replaced by identification with 
“whiteness,” religion, and socioeconomic class.14 This means of assimilation greatly 
stressed unification under American culture rather than a connection between those of 
German descent.  
 Yet, Kazal also emphasized the variance of the ethnic experience in the post-war 
U.S. There tended to be “a greater expression of public Germanness” in cities like 
Chicago where more support could be derived from a larger German population.15 
Likewise, Leslie Tischauser’s accounts of German Americans in the Midwest portrayed 
similar trends. With membership in German societies regaining ground in this area during 
the interwar period, Tischauser proposed that calls for unity superseded fears of 
persecution. Nevertheless, the enthusiasm of the organizations’ leaders often failed to 
gain ground elsewhere as they faced a largely “apathetic and unresponsive 
public…[un]interested in ethnic issues.”16  
 Most notably, these findings present an understanding of the divided state of the 
German American community immediately preceding World War II. Kazal and 
Tischauer both described the influence of geographic location on the strength of ethnic 
organizations. However, it is clear that the national cohesiveness of this group had been 
irreversibly fragmented by assimilation and prejudice. The reappearance of a “subdued”                                                         
 13. Russel A. Kazal, Becoming Old Stock: The Paradox of German-American Identity (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 2.  
 14. Kazal, Old Stock, 270.  
 15. Kazal, Old Stock, 272.  
 16. Leslie V. Tischauser, The Burden of Ethnicity: The German Question in Chicago, 1914-1941 
(New York: Garland Publishing, 1990), 96, 109. 
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German identity in the interwar years foreshadowed the timidity of ethnic associations 
during World War II.17 Nevertheless, the condition of the German America during this 
period created the environment under which Emil Auer’s relief initiative could emerge as 
a humanitarian unifier.  
 
Ethnic Organizations: Cultural Despite Radicalism  
 Understanding the state of German American organizations leading up to U.S. 
entrance into the war creates a clearer context for Auer’s efforts. Despite waning interest 
in German societies, the interwar period saw the tentative reemergence of culturally 
focused organizations. Gatherings within the German American community centered on 
the more traditional aspects of German heritage.18 Yet, memories of poor treatment 
during World War I conjured fears of renewed persecution. Emphasis on cultural 
observance rather than political exploits counteracted fading interest in ethnic 
identification and improved the public perception of German Americans.19 
 Tolzmann asserted that the community suffered linguistic and cultural losses due 
to the pressures of assimilation. These developments especially affected German 
American cohesion shortly preceding the Second World War. He further argued that the 
German-American Citizens League and the Steuben Society of America faced a loss of 
approval due to their political pursuits soon after World War I. Prolonged criticism of 
these groups shifted their focus to one emphasizing the more neutral facets of German 
heritage. The American populace perceived the German Americans as a lesser threat, and                                                         
 17. Kazal, Old Stock, 193.  
      18. Kazal, Old Stock, 193; Tolzmann, Experience, 302.  
 19. Timothy J. Holian, German-Americans and World War II: An Ethnic Perspective (New York: 
Peter Lang Publishing, 1996), 14. 
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subsequently decreased their acts of discrimination.20 As a result, the ethnic community 
saw greater unification through an emphasis on culture.  
 Although Kazal argued that German Americans in the Midwest were more 
inclined to extol their “Germanness,” Timothy Holian maintained that the group also 
emphasized a mindset of isolationism. While the ethnic community sought a means of 
unification, the majority looked not to Germany, but rather within their own ranks, for 
guidance and validation.21 Yet, the emergence of radical organizations during the 1930s 
questioned this very occurrence. The most outspoken and visible of these groups, the 
Amerikadeutscher Bund (German American Federation), sought to reassert German 
authority in the United States. But the organization only gained support on a small scale, 
as the larger ethnic community had adopted American ideals and did hold Nazi beliefs. 
Nonetheless, the American public was especially distressed by the emergence of the 
Bund because the group’s leader, Fritz Kuhn, exaggerated his claims of influence and 
power.22  
 Susan Canedy contended that the very persecution endured by German Americans 
during the First World War fueled the formation of extremist groups like the Bund. She 
asserted that rapid assimilation drove a minority of the ethnic population to support the 
radical movement.23 Bund members were seen as disillusioned Germans living in United 
States whose “desperate cling[ing] to their ethnicity” would confirm their exile from both 
American society and larger portion of the German American community.24 The                                                         
      20. Tolzmann, Experience, 304-307; Holian, Perspective, 14.  
 21. Holian, Perspective, 14-16.  
 22. Tolzmann, Experience, 319-320. 
 23. Susan Canedy, America’s Nazis: A Democratic Dilemma (Menlo Park, CA: Markgraf 
Publications Group, 1990), 1-2.  
 24. Canedy, Nazis, 1.  
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prominence of the German American Bund in the public sphere may have provided 
deterrence of ethnic unity, but also encouraged further emphasis on cultural pursuits for 
the organizations already in existence. 
 In 1938, the Bund was put on trial and publicly examined by House Committee 
on Un-American Activities for their ties to the Nazi Party abroad. Tolzmann declared that 
the congressional hearings irrevocably tarnished the reputation of German Americans and 
helped perpetuate a revival of ethnic suspicion.25 Although the Bund was created to 
reassert German identity amid American prejudice, the group’s actions evidently had a 
detrimental effect on the ethnic community as a whole. Public perception and efforts to 
limit Bund activity further lessened the prevalence and approval of extremist 
organizations. To offset negative publicity, German Americans staged protests with the 
intention of emphasizing the split within the ethnic community. Anti-Nazi associations 
were formed by German Americans to draw distinction between those who were loyal to 
the American public and those who maintaining political ties with Germany. 
Nevertheless, while the majority of ethnic community declared its support of the United 
States, a lesser scale of anti-Germanism emerged alongside Adolf Hitler’s rise to power.26 
 Essentially, German American organizations existing at the outbreak of the 
Second World War were subjected to public scrutiny in light of Bund activity. While the 
majority of these associations pursued a cultural means of unification, radicalism 
threatened to tear apart the ethnic community. As tension rose overseas, groups like the 
American Aid for German War Prisoners were caught between the pressures of 
patriotism and the divisive nature of their ethnic identification.                                                          
 25. Tolzmann, Experience, 320. 
 26. Holian, Perspective, 34; Tolzmann, Experience, 322.  
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The Outbreak of War: Perception and Internment 
 When war erupted in Europe in 1939, public opinion shifted towards an even 
greater mistrust of the German Americans. As tensions continued to rise over the 
following year, the government sought to compile a record of all legal resident aliens in 
the United States. The process registered five million individuals nationwide by 1941. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also created an inventory of “potentially 
dangerous” German Americans, especially noting the memberships of pro-Nazi 
associations. The resulting lists were used to identify German Americans who had 
retained foreign citizenship shortly following American entrance into the war. Japanese 
Americans also were also targeted in similar efforts. A second round of registration and 
investigation in 1942 ensured that “German legal resident aliens with anything less of a 
spotless record and reputation [could] be hold under suspicion as a potential security 
threat.”27 The outcome resulted in the arrest and internment of those labeled as 
“dangerous enemy aliens and Americans of questionable loyalty.”28  
 Interestingly, there was a distinct divide in perception towards the Germans and 
Japanese, as tensions rose in both the European and the Pacific. While both ethnic groups 
were interned as the United States entered the war, a separation of views conjured racial 
epithets and created varying means of treatment. As the American public was informed of 
Adolf Hitler’s atrocities, a criticism of violence was not commonly directed towards the 
German people. Instead, Americans associated National Socialism with the war crimes. 
On the other hand, the Japanese were dehumanized and seen as the key perpetrators of 
escalating tensions. The attack on Pearl Harbor also likely helped cement this growing                                                         
 27. Holian, Perspective, 89, 91-92, 94, 97.  
 28. Holian, Perspective, 130.  
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belief. Propaganda portrayed the “good German” among the Nazis, while the Japanese 
were collectively shown as a malevolent race. These stereotypes came to affect 
perceptions of German and Japanese Americans during the course of internment and 
throughout the war.29 But the lack of racial distinction when considering the German 
likely allowed for an acceptance of possibility of good, humanitarian action within the 
German American community. Nonetheless, fears of the Nazi threat against the United 
States fueled the search for subversiveness among the country’s immigrants.   
 Therefore, it was two months prior to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor that the 
government began to prepare for German American internment. The process itself 
commenced four days before American entrance into the European warfront by President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s own decree.30 While internment camps were located throughout 
the country, jurisdiction over their management spanned the Justice Department, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the U.S. military.  
 While Japanese American internment was exasperated by widespread evacuation 
and relocation, the German Americans faced a somewhat different fate through selective 
detention. Internees of these ethnicities were occasionally housed in different areas of the 
same facilities, although they usually occupied separate camps. Living conditions varied 
between overcrowded processing centers and more personal dwellings within the camps. 
Although families were sometimes interned together, a large portion of the facilities 
                                                        
 29. John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War” (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1986), 34, 322; Holian, Perspective, 14.  
 30. Don Heinrich Tolzmann, ed., German Americans in the World Wars: The World War Two 
Experience, The Internment of German-Americans, vol. 4, sect 1, ed. Arthur D. Jacobs and Joseph E. 
Fallon (München: K.G. Saur, 1995), 1498; The start date of German American internment was December 
7, 1941. The Enemy Alien Act and Section 21, Title 50 of the U.S. Code were cited as the preexisting 
authorization for alien internment upon the U.S. declaration of war against Japan (December 8, 1941); 
Holian, Perspective, 97, 135. 
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housed solely German males under suspicion. A number of women decided to join their 
imprisoned husbands “’voluntarily’…due to economic and family hardship.”31 Others 
remained safely at home with their children, unsure of their husbands’ fates.  
 Stephen Fox argued that the psychological toll of internment created low morale 
among German Americans. This development was in line with the Justice Department’s 
intention to “intimidate the German community without alienating the general 
population.”32 But as some internees grew to resent the restrictions of camp, their “threat” 
became considerably higher. The German government offered incentives to those who 
would give up their American residency, guaranteeing their welfare through repatriation 
proceedings. As a result, U.S. government feared that naturalized, first generation 
German Americans might also join in support of the Nazis. In hopes of preempting shifts 
in loyalty, the Young Men and Women’s Christian Associations delivered war relief 
provisions to the camps. The organizations provided entertainment and school supplies to 
lift the burden from the interned families. These items helped to counteract, relatively 
successfully, the aid given to the camps by the Nazi Party itself.33 
 In total, the federal government interned 10,905 German American residents and 
citizens. Coupled with others of European descent, German Americans comprised fifty-
six percent of those interned in the U.S. over the course of the war. In addition to 
Japanese Americans, those of Italian heritage also composed the ranks of the detention 
                                                        
 31. Holian, Perspective, 137, 139-140. 
 32. Stephen Fox, Fear Itself: Inside the FBI Roundup of German Americans During World War II 
(Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, Inc., 2005), xxiv; Stephen Fox, America's Invisible Gulag: A Biography of 
German American Internment & Exclusion in World War II: Memory and History (New York: Peter Lang, 
2000), 169-170, 176-177. 
      33. Fox, Gulag, 176-177.  
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camps.34 Overall, the internment process created a sense of isolation and exclusion, as the 
ethnic identity again became a means of discrimination. The treatment of German 
Americans provides insight into the conditions under which the American Aid for 
German War Prisoners functioned. Although Emil Auer was himself a naturalized 
citizen, his status as a first generation immigrant still aroused suspicion from the 
government. As Auer sent aid to the internment centers, it is also important to recognize 
the role the camps played in the organization’s fundraising and distribution.   
 
German Prisoners of War in North America 
 The Allies did not confine their prisoners of war solely to incarceration in Europe, 
but instead distributed the servicemen across the United States and to British 
Commonwealth camps internationally. While the American Aid for German War 
Prisoners contributed a small portion of their proceeds to U.S. internment camps, the 
larger scope of Auer’s initiative instead focused on these POWs. In total, approximately 
378,000 Germans were housed in the U.S.35 American treatment of these soldiers 
presents a larger perspective of public sentiment towards those of German descent.  
  While the U.S. upheld international standards for POW treatment, residents 
believed that the government handled the servicemen too leniently. Newspapers ran 
headlines declaring a national “coddling” of the prisoners.36 But public outlook was not 
                                                        
 34. Tolzmann, Internment, 1498, 1516-1519; Holian, Perspective, 129.  
 35. Robert D. Billinger, Nazi POWs in the Tar Heel State (Gainesville, FL: University Press of 
Florida, 2008), xiii; David Carter, POW, Behind Canadian Barbed Wire: Alien, Refugee and Prisoner of 
War Camps in Canada, 1914-1946 (Elkwater, AB: Eagle Butte Press, 1998), 191.   
      36. Richard P. Walker, The Lone Star State and the Swastika: Prisoners of War in Texas (Austin, 
TX: Eakin Press, 2001), 164-165; International standards for the treatment of prisoners of war were set 
forth by the Geneva Convention (1929); Dietrich Schindler and Jiří Toman, “Convention Relative to the 
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always so unified under this negative opinion. A more humanizing side was taken in 
response to prisoner escapes, as a portion of the population understood the soldiers’ 
desires to return home to Germany. Furthermore, as POWs often engaged in work outside 
of the camps, Americans became acquainted with the Germans on an individual basis. It 
was found that in such a situation, “Positive stereotypes replaced negative ones among 
those in close contact with the POWs.”37 Generally, there tended to be an array of 
perspectives, with the most adamant being against the Germans, and more restrained 
appreciating an intrinsic sense of commonality.  
 In reviewing the treatment within the camps themselves, governmental action also 
varied. Meredith Adams depicted the more severe handling of German prisoners as an 
attempt to gaining information on subversive activities. Efforts ranged from spying and 
interrogation to the degradation of living conditions.38 Conversely, Matthias Reiss 
documented the positive bonds formed between American soldiers and imprisoned 
corporals. The guardsmen became aware of the masculinity they shared with the POWs, 
which resulted in a more decent treatment of the prisoners.39 Therefore, American 
opinion and conduct towards the Germans appears to be in accordance to the level of 
personal interaction between the two groups. If the Americans had a high level of contact 
                                                        
and Other Documents (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988): 339-366; Arnold Krammer, Nazi 
Prisoners of War in America (Chelsea, MI: Scarborough House, 1996), 305. 
 37. John Hammond Moore, The Faustball Tunnel: German POWs in America and their Great 
Escape (New York: Random House, 1978), 221; Robert D. Billinger, Hitler's Soldiers in the Sunshine 
State: German POWs in Florida (Gainesville, FL : University Press of Florida, 2000), 118.  
      38. Meredith Lentz Adams, Murder and Martial Justice: Spying and Retribution in World War II 
America (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2011), xix.  
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with the German prisoners in a fairly equalized setting, a mutual sense of understanding 
was able to arise in spite of national alliances.  
 Finally, David Carter’s portrayal of German prisoners of war in Canada 
complements the descriptions of those housed in the United States. Carter classified the 
camps as Commonwealth prisons, and noted that there was an evident questioning of 
jurisdiction between Canadian and British authorities. Nonetheless, it did not appear as if 
Canadian treatment of German soldiers was greatly influenced by the conflict occurring 
overseas in England. Although logistically differentiated from the American facilities, 
Carter noted no further deviation from U.S. conduct. Most notably, Great Britain sent 
roughly 40,000 German prisoners of war to Canada from 1940 through 1942. During that 
time, the European Student Relief Fund and War Prisoner’s Aid of the YMCA 
complemented Auer’s relief work by bringing aid to the imprisoned servicemen.40 
 Essentially, an understanding of the prisoner of war experience lends perspective 
to the relief efforts of the American Aid for German War Prisoners. While a lingering 
degree of mistrust affected those of German descent, the treatment of the POWs portrays 
another perspective. Although resentment towards the German prisoners of war often 
existed throughout North America, personal connections with the soldiers tended to 
change the Allied outlook. It especially important to note that the quantity of study on the 
Canadian camps is far less than that compiled on the U.S. facilities.  
  
 
                                                        
      40. David Carter, Canadian, 11, 43, 61; Sheldon Kirshner, “Doc Tells of German PoWs in 
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Secondary Source Overview  
 Overall, the formation of the American Aid for German War Prisoners speaks to a 
larger history of the German American experience. While scholarly work on this war 
relief effort has not previously been published, various periodicals present insight into 
Emil Auer’s experience and perspectives. These pieces are not a substitute for academic 
research, but provide at least a means of comparison to subsequent primary source 
evidence. In the absence of further secondary analysis on this war relief effort, scholarly 
writings contextualizing the group’s formation have been examined.  
 During World War I and the interwar period, the German Americans experienced 
a shift in both ethnic identification and group cohesiveness. In hopes of avoiding 
persecution, the community encouraged expressions of German culture and American 
loyalty. The emergence more radical organizations, like the German American Bund, 
threatened the sense of ethnic unity and created negative publicity among the American 
populace. But the potential presence of “good Germans” likely allowed for the 
acceptance of more neutral causes.  
 The selective internment of German Americans may have created a heightened 
emphasis on bringing aid to both German Americans and the prisoners of war. Although 
neither group experienced unbearable conditions in the detention camps, the American 
populace still regarded both groups with a degree of suspicion. The emergence of 
humanitarian aid organizations also likely provided a sense of purpose and unity for the 
German American community. Emil Auer’s war relief effort combined a sense of 
American charity, but also avoided displays of ethnic aggression.  
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 In assessing the integrity of the information gathered, it is certain that there is not 
currently an extensive amount of secondary source material examining these various 
facets. Based often upon individual projects, oral histories interviews, and newspaper 
commentaries, it is difficult to wholly endorse the scholarly nature of each of these 
sources. It is with these understandings that this thesis will seek to present a narrative and 
analysis of the American Aid for German War Prisoners. Supported by this initial 
secondary source overview, the subsequent writing will investigate the fundraising efforts 
and federal mandates regulating this war relief effort. Research will draw upon 
collections of the organization’s newsletters, Auer’s personal correspondences, and 
government documents chronicling the group’s tenure. A return to secondary source 
understandings will then combine with the archival findings to suggest the larger legacy 
of Emil Auer’s relief effort. 
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CHAPTER 2.  
 
Establishment and Motivation  
 
 
 
 By the mid-1930s, the United States had begun a slow recovery from the Great 
Depression. Mirroring this arduous process, German Americans had gradually regained 
their image as “good Americans” over the course of the interwar period. The ethnic 
community increasingly embraced the conventions of their adopted country over the 
customs of the homeland. But overseas, Adolf Hitler was amassing his stronghold in 
Germany. After his rise to power in 1933, the U.S. saw an influx in immigration by those 
seeking to escape political persecution. With this new wave of Europeans creating a 
source of comparison, it was soon understood that the German American community had 
become divided between the “hyphenated” elements of their ethnic identity.1 The 
evolving definitions of Americanness, Germanness, and German Americanness were 
each in question.  
 It became increasingly evident that the assimilated immigrants already established 
in the U.S. were notably different from their predecessors. While previous groups had 
held strong attachment to their German roots, second-generation German Americans 
identified more with American culture over German tradition. Youth generally displayed 
                                                        
 1. Holian, Perspective, 14; Tolzmann, Experience, 317; “Hyphenated Americanism” refers to the 
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a “lack of interest in German associational life,”2 an occurrence that further deprived 
German American organizations of extensive support. First-generation immigrants, on 
the other hand, were both influenced by reminders of their heritage and a sense of loyalty 
to their adopted country. 
 Similar trends were also present among Japanese Americans at this time. To 
counteract criticism from the American public and a disconnect with the Nisei (second-
generation), the Issei (first-generation) adopted a policy of biculturalism. By 
compromising their strict adherence to Japanese culture and acknowledging the American 
influence on their lives, the first generation sought to perpetuate a sense of collective 
identity.3 Likewise, recently immigrated Germans faced a struggle to assert American 
patriotism, appeal to the younger generations, and maintain cultural ties to their heritage.4 
Nearing the outbreak of war, a renewal ethnic persecution was imminent. In both 
immigrant groups, the greatest emphasis was therefore placed upon unification under 
politically neutral expressions of culture.  
 As German Americans of the older generations still desired an outlet for 
expression and congregation, the organizations that emerged immediately before the war 
reflected an emphasis on ethnic celebration. German intellectuals in the U.S. argued for a 
“middle course…of cultural mediation,” in which German tradition was preserved 
alongside American allegiance. Founded immediately after the First World War, the 
Steuben Society of America emerged as a leader on the East Coast during the interwar 
                                                        
      2. Kazal, Old Stock, 199.  
 3. Lon Kurashige, “The Problem of Biculturalism: Japanese American Identity and Festival before 
World War II,” Journal of American History 86, no. 4 (March 2000): 1634-1635.  
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period. Shifting its focus from politics to cohesion heading into the 1930s, the 
organization brought German Americans together as a unified ethnic community.5  
 With notions of cultural unity, the Spring Garden Association was formed in 
Buffalo, New York, in April 1938 under the leadership of local stamp collector Emil 
Auer. The group held annual German-themed festivals and also collaborated with 
neighboring groups like the Schuhplattler-Gebirgstrachtenverein, Edelweiss Buffalo.6 In 
this manner, the Spring Garden supported camaraderie within the organization itself, but 
also sought to forge ties with similar ethnic associations. To perpetuate a unified front, 
German Americans began to understand the importance of cooperation rather than 
competition among their ranks. The ethnic community hoped to pursue politically neutral 
activity to placate emerging criticism from the American public and government. 
 Consequently, it is reasonable that the German American population turned to 
humanitarian relief at the advent of World War II. Despite reservations, the first 
generation was apparently torn between a sense of loyalty to the United States and 
concern for their relatives remaining overseas. To make amends between their desires to 
uphold American patriotism, maintain ethnic bonds, and display compassion for those 
engaged in warfare, members of the German American community organized what they 
perceived to be impartial acts of philanthropy.   
                                                        
      5. Tolzmann, Experience, 302, 307.  
      6. Emil Auer served as the first President of the Spring Garden Association from 1938 through 
1947; Spring Garden Association, "History: "50 Years Ago,” Spring Garden Association,  
http://www.springarden.com/history.htm (accessed November 5, 2011); Schuhplattler refers to a type of 
folk dance, complemented by the traditional German dress of the Gebirgstrachten. Edelweiss is a type of 
flower found in Germany, likely being a symbolic unifier of the community. The group was declared a 
formal association through the distinction of Verein; Schuhplattler Gebirgstrachten Verein Edelweiss. 
“History.” Schuhplattler Gebirgstrachten Verein Edelweiss Buffalo, Inc. 
http://www.edelweissbuffalo.com/history.html (accessed January 15, 2012). 
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 Interestingly, Tolzmann argued that humanitarian relief by the ethnic community 
dated back to American involvement in World War I and spanned the interwar period, 
“Especially high on the agenda was humanitarian relief for the Old Country, an important 
work because of the English blockade of German ports. Organizations, churches, and 
individuals engaged in a massive labor of love, collecting millions of dollars before 1917 
for the starving children of Germany.”7 These relief initiatives were not often viewed 
with criticism from the U.S. government and public, as they were understood to be a form 
of charity for the innocent victims of war. Often working with the German Red Cross and 
American delegations overseas, the ethnic community momentarily evaded anti-
Germanism through compassionate action.8  
 During the Second World War, humanitarian aid again emerged with a similar 
purpose, but also became a method of reunifying a divided German America. As was 
previously stated, Stephen Fox cited the influence of the Young Men and Women’s 
Christian Associations within the internment facilities after American entrance into the 
war.9 Coupled with the Red Cross, the YMCA covered much of this stateside relief, 
while the Red Cross provided comprehensive aid internationally. These same 
organizations were equally influential in the relief brought to the prisoner of war camps 
in the United States. On the Canadian side, Carter cited the European Student Relief Fund 
and the War Prisoner’s Aid of the YMCA as especially effective in sending aid to the 
POWs. Jonathan Vance wrote of the importance of the Canadian POWs Association in its 
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efforts to establish communal and supportive care for the POWs.10 Similarly, German 
Americans sought to forge unity on a more local scale and wished to coordinate similar 
initiatives. On these grounds, the American Aid for German War Prisoners was 
established in Buffalo under the same leadership as the Spring Garden Association.  
 Born in Munich in 1904, Emil Auer immigrated to the United States at the age of 
twenty, and was formally naturalized as an American citizen in 1931.11 As a resident of 
Buffalo, Auer served as the first president of the Spring Garden Association in 1938, and 
the founder of the American Aid organization in 1940. A Quaker by practice, Auer’s 
experience with war relief dated back to the end of the First World War when he received 
supplies from American Quakers in Germany.12 Yet, beyond philanthropy, this first-
generation German American was also involved in more extreme elements of the 
reemerging ethnic community. In the early years of its founding, Auer became a leader of 
the German American Bund. 
 The Bund was established in March 1936 at a Buffalo convention of the Bund der 
Freunde des Neuen Deutchland (Friends of New Germany). Gaining national attention 
for his voluble displays of Nazi support, the National Chairman of the German-American 
Bund, Fritz Kuhn, appeared before the House of Representatives in 1939. The Special                                                         
      10. Carter, Canadian, 11; The Canadian POW Relatives Association coordinated efforts to process 
prisoner of war records, managed parcel exchanges with relatives, and brought “all possible comfort” to the 
POWs imprisoned in Canada; Jonathan F. Vance, “Canadian Relief Agencies and Prisoners of War, 1939-
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      11. “Emil Auer,” Tacoma News Tribune, February 8, 1996, obit. sec.; U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of New York, “Emil Auer,” U.S. Naturalization Records and Petitions, National Archives, 
College Park, MD. 
 12. “Die Amerikanische Hilfsaktion für Kriegsgefangene,” AGZ Rundbrief 43/84 (1984): 135; 
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Revoked, American Aid for German War Prisoners Reports, Box 018, President’s War Relief Control 
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Committee on Un-American Activities questioned Kuhn on the “subversive” nature of 
the Bund, and its affiliations with National Socialism abroad. Although the Committee 
could bring no formal charges against Kuhn on these accounts, the leader was indicted 
for the embezzlement of Bund funds.13  
 Over the course of the hearings, the Kuhn was questioned on the involvement of 
other German Americans in his radical group. As the association was founded in Buffalo, 
Emil Auer was indicated as a local leader of the Bund. Although Kuhn denied Auer’s 
connection to the organization, investigations and hearings towards end of the World War 
II proved the Committee’s claims to be true. In 1923, Auer participated in the Munich 
“Beer Hall Putsch” as a member of the Nazi Party. In explanation of his actions, Auer 
said, “I have always avoided the occasion of trouble or violence, but I was only 17 years 
old at the time of the putsch.”14 Perhaps not anticipating Hitler’s ultimate intentions, Auer 
was drawn the Party at an early age.  
 Auer acknowledged his position as a former Buffalo Bund leader, but placed great 
emphasis on his role as a dissenter. He spoke of Kuhn’s attempts to establish uniformed 
Ordungs-Dienst (Order Service), an even more vocal and aggressive division of the 
Bund. Auer claimed that he said, “As long as I am unit leader in Buffalo…there will be 
no uniformed groups there.”15 He stated that the formation of the Spring Garden 
Association was an effort to break ties with the rapidly radicalizing German American 
Bund. He disbanded Buffalo’s branch of the Bund, and prohibited Spring Garden                                                         
 13. Holian, German-Americans, 26; Canedy, Nazis, 182, 184, 199; Tolzmann, Experience, 320. 
      14. U.S. House of Representatives, “Investigation of House Resolution 282.” Special Committee 
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January 15, 1944, p. 3.  
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members from having involvement in the former group.16 Although Emil Auer 
participated in German political associations leading up to World War II, his change in 
focus reflected the shifts of the larger German American community. Auer’s 
establishment of the Spring Garden Association indicated the growing importance of 
German American culture and neutrality. 
  In this sense, the formation of the American Aid for German War Prisoners is put 
into greater perspective. When his allegiance to the United States was called into question 
during the course of later war trials, Auer adamantly asserted his intention to remain 
removed from foreign aggression. He registered with the United States draft board during 
the conflict as a “contentious objector…[who] always avoided the occasion of trouble or 
violence.”17 His decision indicated the sense of confliction first-generation German 
Americans experienced as tensions rose overseas. Auer pursued humanitarian action to 
aid those immediately affected by a war he did not endorse. Yet, as a recent immigrant, 
his residual connection to Germany encouraged lingering support for the citizens of his 
homeland. Auer hoped to uphold his religious values as a Quaker through charitable 
giving. He shifted cultural pursuits to politically neutral war relief, and sought to sever 
his ties with Nazism for ideological and patriotic motivations. For these apparent reasons, 
Emil Auer attempted to unite the ethnic community through philanthropy, and 
simultaneously sought to lessen criticisms of German American loyalty. 
 As a result, the American Aid for German War Prisoners was formed in 1940. 
Since the United States was not yet involved in the war by this time, the process of                                                         
      16. “Emil Auer asserts Buffalo Members Held Bund Racket,” Salamanca Republican-Press, 
January 14, 1944, p. 1; Police Executives Meet At Blassdell,” Erie County Independent, May 25, 1939, p. 
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applying for permission to raise funds was not incredibly arduous. Jurisdiction over relief 
agencies was given to the Department of State, Division of Controls in 1939. The 
Department sought to compile an inventory of the philanthropic organizations and 
prohibited collaboration with the governments of the warring powers.18 The 1939 
Neutrality Act defined and regulated this war relief by stating, 
 Nothing in this section [8] shall be construed to prohibit the solicitation or 
 collection of funds and contributions to be used for medical aid and  
 assistance, or for food and clothing to relieve human suffering, when such 
 solicitation or collection of funds and contributions is made on behalf of  
 and for use by any person or organization which is not acting for or on  
 behalf of any such government, but all such solicitations and collections  
 of funds and contributions shall be in accordance with and subject to such  
 rules and regulations as may be prescribed. 19 
 
This mandate determined the rules regulating early war relief. The agreements ensured 
that no aid could be prohibited to either side of the war, but that cooperation overseas 
remained neutral. Meeting those requirements, the federal government officially 
registered Auer’s relief effort on September 27, 1940.20 
 The American Aid for German War Prisoners sought to bring the ethnic 
community closer together under one cause. Therefore, solicitation was originally 
focused solely on German Americans. The group’s application to the Department State 
read, “[There shall be a] collecti[on] of money, clothes usf. [sic] through letters or 
personal contact with various German-American Soci[e]ties and individuals within the 
USA. Through voluntarely [sic] appeals in various German language newspapers in this                                                         
      18. U.S. Department of State, Application for Registration, October 2, 1940, File 1, American Aid, 
NARA.  
      19. Sec. 8. (a) of the 1939 Neutrality Act bans the collection of funds on behalf of the foreign 
governments of recognized warring countries; U.S. Department of State, “Neutrality Act of November 4, 
1939,” Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1943), 500-501.  
      20. The American Aid for German War Prisoners was registered under Permit Number 374; U.S. 
Department of State, Application, October 2, 1940, American Aid, NARA. 
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country. Through collecting boxes in German clubs and establishments. (IF 
PERMISSABLE).”21 By these means, Auer intended to garner support through German 
American organizations already in operation. As he appealed to ethnic communities 
nationwide, publicity in the media allowed his group to gain donations and recognition. 
The German American press had been on the decline since the interwar period and took 
measurably less political stances leading into the war.22 But as language still remained the 
one sure unifier of the first-generation, and Auer’s organization was of humanitarian 
intention, this approach to fundraising appeared especially effective.  
 At the onset of collection efforts, Auer’s focus remained on the prisoner of war 
camps across the national border. Eager to organize the relief initiative, he petitioned the 
Canadian government for permission to distribute care packages. But the authorities 
instead instructed Auer to operate through the Prisoners of War Aid of the YMCA, 
located in New York City, in lieu of sending donations directly.23 Undeterred, he 
coordinated with this larger organization, while also seeking to forge his own path of 
independent war relief elsewhere. Almost immediately following registration, the group 
pursued permission to send aid to Commonwealth camps in Jamaica. Accordingly, Auer 
was granted the ability to provide relief to German and Italian POWs and civilian 
internees housed in these British detention facilities.24  
 Throughout the early years of war, the American Aid organization continued 
global expansion. In April 1941, the State Department extended the group’s jurisdiction                                                         
      21. “Usf.” is the abbreviation of the German phrase, “und so fort.” The English translation is the 
equivalent to “and so forth;” U.S. Department of State, Application, October 2, 1940, American Aid, 
NARA.   
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      23. Emil Auer to Mr. Price, U.S. Department of State, February 25, 1941, File 1, American Aid, 
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to include Surname, as well as the Dutch Possessions in the West and East Indies. By 
September of the same year, the relief effort had grown to encompass the German and 
Italian prisoners in British camps, spanning Bermuda to St. Lucia, and extending to the 
Dominican Republic. Two months later, Auer sought to raise funds for Axis POWs 
housed in India. Finally, shortly following American entrance into the war, the American 
Aid for German War Prisoners had grown to support prisoner of war and internment 
camps from Canada to Australia, the Caribbean to South America, England to India, and 
finally, the United States.25 Despite such far-reaching relief, local initiatives tended to be 
the greatest strength of the aid organization. The primary focus of the group effort was on 
the ten POW camps in Canada, as the prisons were in close proximity to Auer’s Western 
New York headquarters. It is likely for this primary reason that the organization’s 
attention rested so greatly on the Canadian prisoners of war.  
 While Emil Auer’s efforts can be attributed to his personal background and 
community involvement, others involved in the initiative were likely motivated by 
slightly different causes. As many first generation immigrants remained in contact with 
any family members that still resided overseas, German Americans had immediate 
connections to German POWs. As a result, some supporters of the American Aid 
organization sought to directly assist their imprisoned relatives. Emil Auer’s group 
allowed them a neutral outlet to maintain those ancestral connections.   
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State, November 5, 1941 and Emil Auer to U.S. Department of State, January 3, 1942 and Emil Auer to 
American Red Cross, December 9, 1942, File 2, American Aid, NARA; Report of the American Aid for 
German War Prisoners, January 1942, Vol. 9, Prisoners of War Bulletin, microfilm, New York City Public 
Library Periodicals and Microfilms, New York, NY (hereafter cited as American Aid, POW Bulletin). 
American Aid for German War Prisoners 
   
31 
 Such was true with a young member of the Germany American community in 
East Greenbush, New York. Born in Panknin, Germany on September 13, 1921, Erika 
Plath’s connection to the New York Capital District dated back to her early childhood. 
Upon relocating to the United States in the late 1920s, Plath attended grammar school 
locally and ultimately graduated from Van Rensselaer High School in Rensselaer, New 
York. After completing her education in 1940, Plath immediately joined the commercial 
workforce.26 
 Erika Plath’s involvement in the ethnic community was evident in her adolescent 
years. Her presence at local Amerikadeutscher Volksbund (German American League) 
festivals, such as the Völksischer Tag (German Day) in Schenectady, New York,27 
demonstrated an evidently strong connection with German tradition preceding the war. 
Although she was largely raised in New York State, it is apparent that Plath was still 
tightly rooted in the customs of her native country. For this reason, she fell in line 
somewhere between the first and second generations: coming of age immersed amid 
American culture, yet embracing a sense of ethnic heritage unlike many others in her 
position.  
 Upon the eruption of war in Europe, Plath was especially affected by news 
coverage detailing the imprisonment of German soldiers on Lake Ontario. Articles 
appearing her local newspaper spoke of the hurried assemblage of the prisoner of war 
camps over the border, “England’s decision to use Canada as a prison base for war                                                         
      26. Erika Plath, “Graduation Memories,” [ca. 1933], File 12, Erika Plath Papers: 1931-1945, Box 
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National Archives, College Park, MD; Graduation Program, Van Rensselaer High School, June 21, 1940, 
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captives was reached suddenly and there was no time for more elaborate preparation. 
Some of the prisoners are in temporary camps where they are necessarily more strictly 
regimented and every moment is under inspection of armed guards because there are no 
physical barriers.” 28 Articles of this nature portrayed the relatively poor conditions the 
prisoners faced due to the rapid construction of the camps and likely concerned those 
with the strongest ties to Germany. Tuning in to additional news coverage, Plath was 
further informed that a German POW bearing her mother’s maiden name was imprisoned 
in Canada. Concerned for his health and hoping to forge a connection, she sought to 
contact the serviceman.   
 Therefore, in February 1941, Plath corresponded with Emil Auer in an appeal to 
his camp connections in Canada,  
 I read an article recently in the Albany Times Union which acquainted me  
 with your committee and I am interested for I am of German origin and  
 have also heard that a person and cousin might be [sic] in one of the 
  prison camps. I do not know exactly where he is and would like to know  
 if you could help me in locating him and thus finding out if we are related.  
 The prisoner’s name is Ernest Krey, and according to the shortwave  
 broadcast, he was a flight commander. He may have been interned in the  
 camp at Espanola, Ontario. If I could get in touch with him I would like to  
 know on what section of Germany he had lived and if he know of a family  
 by the name of Franz Plath whose wife’s maiden name was Elsa Krey,  
 daughter of Mrs. Berta Krey of Panknin, Germany. If you can help me, I   
 will greatly appreciate the service. I would also like to know if I could be  
 of service in helping your organization in the work it is doing.29 
  
Plath’s familial ties to the prisoners likely increased her motivation to become involved 
in the war relief initiative. Upon arriving in the United States, the Plath and Krey 
families, related through Erika Plath’s mother, occupied the same household in East                                                         
      28. W.W. Chaplin, “War Prisoners Held Near State Border,” Albany Times Union, October 4, 
1940, file 15. Erika Plath Papers; Guy Richards, “Empire’s Jail Holds Babel of Foes,” Sunday News, 
November 17, 1940, file 15, Erika Plath Papers.  
      29. Erika Plath to Emil Auer,  [ca. January-February 1941], file 15, Erika Plath Papers. 
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Greenbush.30 But since her immigration came at such an early age, Plath did not seem to 
know a vast amount about her relatives remaining in Germany. Nevertheless, she was 
concerned enough to inquire into the background and wellbeing of someone who could 
potentially be her cousin. Such an occurrence indicates her continued connection to 
Germany despite being raised in the United States.  
 Yet, it does not appear that Plath was able to directly contact the serviceman in 
Canada. Although the Geneva Convention (1929) allowed relief organizations the 
opportunity to send parcels to the POWs, the imprisoned soldiers were only allowed to 
write letters home to their family members.31 The inquiry would likely have gone through 
the Canadian POW Relatives Association, but there appeared to be no evidence of 
correspondence with the group. Since records did not verify that Erika Plath was directly 
related to Ernest Krey, the Director of Internment in Ottawa, Ontario, did not approve of 
their correspondence. He further stated that if the American Aid for German War 
Prisoners were to “attempt contacts or abuses of the privileges granted...the society 
[would be] placed on the Black List.”32 As Auer wished to remain on amiable terms with 
the authorities, he did not pursue the inquiry for Plath any further. Despite the setback in 
direct communication, Erika Plath eagerly extended her help to the war relief effort in 
early 1941, “According to your letter you spoke of opening if possible a branch of your 
organization in this section of the state. I would be willing to cooperate with you in any 
                                                        
      30. 1930 Census, “Elizabeth Kray [sic], NARA.  
      31. Section IV, Article 35 states the international allowance of prisoner of war correspondence 
with the outside world. Section IV, Article 36 states the permission of care packages for the POWs; 
Schindler and Toman, “Convention,” 349; “Copies and Excerpts,” American Aid for German War 
Prisoners, February 1943, POW Bulletin. 
 32. Vance, “Canadian Relief,” 127; H. Stethem to Emil Auer, December 25, 1940, File 15, Erika 
Plath Papers.  
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way possible.”33 With prospects of aiding long-lost relatives and those of similar heritage, 
Plath began her own local division of the American Aid organization.  
 In one sense, Auer and Plath shared an ethnic heritage that motivated their mutual 
involvement in humanitarian relief. Both understood the importance of aiding those 
affected by war, and each was actively involved in the German American community. 
But while Emil Auer was raised overseas amid another time and culture, the majority of 
Plath’s adolescence was spent the United States. Therefore, while Erika Plath’s direct ties 
to Germany were to a lesser degree than Auer’s, the potential for familial connections 
with the POWs spurred her interest in philanthropy. In this way, the American Aid for 
German War Prisoners became a unifier of the ethnic community and overcame 
generational differences. 
 Interestingly, Erika Plath’s participation in humanitarian relief was not confined 
solely to Auer’s initiative. Plath sought involvement in organizations similar to the 
American Aid, as was indicated through her collection of pamphlets distributed by the 
Kyffhäuser Kriegshilfswerk (Kyffhäuser War Relief).34 Seeking to send relief German 
military hospitals, the Philadelphia-based Kyffhäuser intended to better the living 
conditions of those involved in the war, albeit with a slightly different focus than Auer.35 
Their range of relief also varied greatly from that of the American Aid organization. The 
group intended to raise funds for injured soldiers and citizens in the warzones of 
Germany and German-occupied Poland.36                                                         
      33. Erika Plath to Emil Auer, [ca. January-February 1941], File 15, Erika Plath Papers.  
      34. The distinction “Kyffhäuser” refers to a mountainous region in Germany; “Kyffhäuser 
Kriegshilfswerk,” July 1941, File 10, Erika Plath Papers.  
      35. “Kyffhäuser Kriegshilfswerk,” July 1941, File 10, Erica Plath Papers.  
      36. U.S. Department of State, “Application for Registration,” October 4, 1939, File 1, Kyffhäuser 
League of German War Veterans in U.S.A. Reports, Box 105, President’s War Relief Control Board 
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 The Krieghilfswerk itself was essentially a subset of the larger “Kyffhäuserbund, 
League of German War Veterans in U.S.A.” Described by historian Heinrich Winkler as 
a “veritable mass movement” at the end of the nineteenth century, Kriegervereine 
(warriors associations) like the Kyffhäuserbund der Deutschen Landkriegerverbände 
(Kyffhäuser Union of German Warrior Associations) had united the “‘ordinary folk,’ who 
cherished the memories of their years of military service.” 37 Following the conclusion of 
World War I, German veterans who immigrated to the United States formed their own 
division overseas.38 Upon the outbreak of the Second World War, these former soldiers 
sought to contribute humanitarian relief to those injured over the course of battle, as they 
knew firsthand the consequence of warfare.   
 In November 1939, the group’s National Commander, Karl Schumacher, 
described his organization’s motivations through their war relief application, “Knowing 
what a War means, we could like to help those who have to suffer from the present 
War.”39 He further stated, “A war creates sufferings on both sides. Permit me to draw 
your attention to the fact that we in the true spirit of men who know war by experience 
and in the true spirit of comradeship…wanted to help suffers on both sides.”40 The 
veterans may have possessed a connection to the soldiers fighting in the German Army 
due to the very nature of their earlier service, but their efforts remained neutral like 
                                                        
Collection, Records of Temporary Committee, Commissions and Boards, RG 220, National Archives, 
College Park, MD (hereafter cited as Kyffhäuser, NARA); Karl Schumacher to American Red Cross, File 
1, April 23, 1940, Kyffhäuser, Box 105, NARA, 1.  
      37. Heinrich August Winkler, Germany: The Long Road West (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 249. 
      38. Official authorization of the Kyffhäuser Krieghilfswerk was issued under Permit Number 202; 
Karl Schumacher to U.S. Department of State, November 19, 1939, File 1, Kyffhäuser, Box 105, NARA. 
      39. Schumacher to Department of State, November 19, 1939, Kyffhäuser, NARA. 
 40. Schumacher to Red Cross, April 23, 1940, Kyffhäuser, NARA, 1.  
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Auer’s cause. Rather than bringing aid solely to the Axis Powers, they sought to send 
relief to all nationalities of wounded soldiers under German care. 
 As a point of clarification, Schumacher emphasized that his association was “in 
no way connected with the German Government or Army according to information 
received by the Germany Embassy in Washington.”41 However, the organization sought 
to work with the NS Reichskriegerbund (National Socialist Reich Warriors Association), 
the transitory name of the original German Kyffhäuser. As the “NS” distinction in the 
name signified the group’s affiliation with the Nazis, it is relatively surprising that the 
Krieghilfswerk did not encounter further scrutiny at its start.   
 Despite such dubious alliances, Schumacher’s initiative remained markedly loyal 
to the United States, and wished solely to provide aid as an alleviation of wartime 
suffering. A first generation veteran spoke openly about a similar sentiment, 
 I came to this country in September 1923 and took out my American  
 citizen papers in April 1929 and believe to be considered a good citizen  
 in our community…I have fought in world war, was wounded and  
 became a prisoner of the French. My sympathies stretch out to all  
 common peoples in Europe at the present time. Naturally, I should like  
 to give also to the poor people and wounded soldiers in Germany who  
 are the tools of their government.42  
 
Regardless of the mainstream fear of the rise of American Nazism, the German American 
veterans representing the Kyffhäuser did not seem to align with Hitler’s wartime agenda. 
Instead, members of the group were sympathetic to those most highly affected by the 
violence in Europe. The veterans’ status as first generation immigrants nearly ensured 
                                                        
      41. U.S. Department of State, Application, October 4, 1939, Kyffhäuser, NARA, 2. 
      42. O.W. Kreutzer to Department of State, United States Government, November 6, 1940, File 2, 
Kyffhäuser, Box 104, NARA.  
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that strong ties remained to Germany, but they were not in a position, nor seemingly 
wished to take sides in the conflict.  
 While the Kyffhäuser appealed to a narrower base of German Americans in 
comparison to the American Aid, the general approach of both groups was comparable. 
The veterans’ methods of raising funds were especially similar to Auer’s. To secure 
donations, the Krieghilfwerk intended to “solicit or to collect contributions at our Post 
meetings or at charity affairs for this purpose or at meetings at other German American 
Societies or to ask in pamphlets or in American newspapers in the German language for 
contributions.”43 This appeal to established German American organizations is especially 
important, as it again highlights the desire to create a cohesive ethnic community. Much 
like Auer’s intent to use German language outlets, Schumacher utilized print medium as a 
means of generating support. But it is also essential to note that the Kyffhäuser’s 
initiatives seemed to overlay the fundraising target of similar organizations like the 
American Aid for German War Prisoners. Instead of working in unison on humanitarian 
relief, the two groups unknowingly competed for the same market of donors.  
 Along these lines, the State Department issued a letter to Krieghilfswerk, 
questioning the initiative’s effectiveness in comparison to the work of larger relief 
organizations. In reply, Schumacher stated that the veterans’ perspectives as former 
soldiers were more conducive to providing relief than Red Cross. The group reasoned 
that strictly humanitarian associations understood less of war’s destructive nature than 
those who had experienced it firsthand. The National Commander also offered open 
criticism of the Neutrality Act of 1939 and its tendency to favor of the Allied side of                                                         
    43. U.S. Department of State, Application, October 4, 1939, Kyffhäuser, NARA, 1. 
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conflict. He emphasized, “From the beginning, we wanted to be neutral in spirit and not 
only help the German wounded but also the wounded soldiers of the other nations…[as 
the repeal of the arms embargo] benefits only one side of the warring nations there should 
be no objection to our desire to help those suffering on the other side.”44 Schumacher 
argued unwaveringly with the State Department, vying for the continued authorization of 
their relief initiatives overseas. He also took a strong stand against U.S. policy, an 
unusual occurrence for German Americans leading up to World War II.45 With 
permission granted to continue their efforts, Kyffhäuser prepared plans for the expansion 
of its war relief. 
 In the same month marking the formation of the American Aid for German War 
Prisoners, the Krieghilfswerk also applied to send relief to German POWs and civilian 
internees detained in Canada. Having received a letter from the German Seaman’s 
Mission in September 1940 requesting support, the organization decided that the appeal 
complied with the Kyffhäuser’s wartime philanthropy. A petition to the State Department 
in January 1941 asked for a formal amendment to acknowledge their permission to aid 
German Canadian internees. A similar request was made help the internees in Jamaica, 
but the government in the second case denied Schumacher’s appeal.46 The more local 
influence and direct appeal of Canada likely motivated the group to help the new cause, 
similar to the initial intentions of Auer’s group. Pressures to downplay the 
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Krieghilfswerk’s involvement with German agencies abroad may also have played a 
factor.  
 Therefore, by the fall of 1940, these two humanitarian organizations were in full 
operation in Canada. Sanctioned by the State Department, the relief efforts allowed for an 
outlet of philanthropy and community organization. The formation of each initiative 
arose out of the evolving nature of the German American identity. Compared to the 
organizations that had been desecrated by anti-German hysteria during World War I, the 
groups emerging during the Second World War were more readily assimilated. As they 
wished to avoid renewed persecution, the majority of German Americans emanated 
political neutrality and American patriotism. First generation immigrants comprised the 
largest percentage of participants in ethnic societies, as they retained ties to their 
homeland. While these individuals intended to remain loyal to the American public, they 
also wished to provide aid for those of similar heritage, familial connection, and the 
victims of warfare.  
 Both the American Aid for German War Prisoners and the Kyffhäuserbund took 
similar measures in their approaches of appealing to the German American community. 
Auer’s emphasis on humanitarian compassion and religious duty allowed his group to 
avoid political scrutiny. Schumacher stressed his organization’s neutrality, as the veterans 
themselves knew the perils of combat and merely wished to send aid. In each case, first-
generation immigrants drove the relief efforts and appealed to the larger German 
American community for support and alliance. Yet, there was imminent potential for 
competition and duplication as both groups pursued the same cause.  
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 Consequently, as the war progressed, these relief efforts were not consistently 
compared to the more radical groups of the time. In lieu of strict ethnic persecution, 
bureaucratic campaigns of consolidation would take a partial role in their eventual 
demise. While suspicion of allegiance lingered as the war waged on, the anti-German 
hysteria of earlier years was not truly revived. German Americans largely avoided the 
intense suspicion that had plagued their existence during the First World War. As a result, 
humanitarian efforts were able unify the ethnic community.
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CHAPTER 3. 
 
Suspicion and Consolidation 
 
 
 
 In the early months of 1941, the fundraising efforts of the American Aid for 
German War Prisoners and Kyffhäuser Krieghilfswerk were meeting success nationwide. 
Emil Auer’s network of chapters included German American communities on the East 
Coast through the Midwest. Humanitarian efforts had grown to involve those of the 
younger generations, among them being Erika Plath. The Kyffhäuser Krieghilfswerk was 
also pursuing similar grounds, but had the advantage of appealing directly to German 
veterans across the country. Centering attention on the Canadian prisoner of war and 
internment camps, the Kyffhäuser shifted its efforts from the more distant wartime 
hospitals overseas to a North American focus.  
 The American Aid for German War Prisoners pursued a combination of 
fundraising campaigns. Auer sent Erika Plath printed collection booklets to document the 
monetary collections she acquired. Beyond direct donations of this sort, the group sold 
50¢ cards bearing German stamps. Auer also sought contributions of books, 
entertainment, sporting equipment, and household goods for the camps.1 Additionally, 
interned seamen in Nebraska made Christmas cards to offset a deficiency in resources,  
“Es war schwierig, genügend Geldmittel aufzubringen. Wir verkauften Weihnachts-
karten, die ein in Fort Lincoln internierter Seemann herstellte, sowie küntliche Edelweiß 
                                                        
 1. Emil Auer to Erika Plath, March 13, 1941, file 9, Erika Plath Papers; Nealeigh, “CARD,” 
German Postal Specialist; American Aid for German War Prisoners, Report #7, February 1942, POW 
Bulletin.  
American Aid for German War Prisoners 
   
42 
– Blumen [It was difficult to raise sufficient funds. We sold Christmas cards, which were 
made by the interned sailors at Fort Lincoln, as well as artistic Edelweiss – flowers].”2 
Although the POWs could not be used to manufacture items specifically for war 
purposes, the imprisoned soldiers were allowed creative outlets that helped subsidize the 
cost of the camps.  
 Both the American Aid and Kyffhäuserbund hosted local fundraising dinners with 
preexisting German American associations. These events helped to perpetuate notions of 
cohesion, as the ethnic community came together in pursuit of a unified cause. 
Furthermore, the two organizations learned of each other’s similar pursuits in 1941 and 
collaborated in a campaign to sell holiday packages. This instance appeared to be the first 
interaction between the two groups, as the potential for cooperation became apparent. 
The donations most often went to purchase “sundries” for the prisoners of war. These 
items included cigarettes, small care packages, and oftentimes clothing.3 
 While the American Aid organization did not seem to encounter much resistance 
in the first months of its operation, the Kyffhäuser likely experienced slightly different 
circumstances. The formal name of the organization changed in November 1940 from the 
“Kyffhäuserbund” to “The Kyffhäuser, League of German War Veterans in U.S.A.”4 
While the distinction, “Bund,” simply indicates a German federation, association, or 
union, the term increasingly took on a negative connotation in the U.S. in light of the 
                                                        
 2. Pohlig, “Hilfsaktion,” AGZ Rundbrief; Auer to Plath, March 13, 1941, Erika Plath Papers; 
Article 37 of the Geneva Convention (1929) states that prisoners of war cannot be used for the benefit of 
“operations of the war;” Schindler and Toman, “Convention,” 347.  
 3. Nealeigh, “CARD,” Postal Specialist; American Aid, Report #7, February 1942, Erika Plath 
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German American Bund hearings. The Kyffhäuser’s ties to the Reichskriegerbund in 
Germany also feasibly perpetuated greater scrutiny of the organization.  
 Jurisdiction over these relief efforts may have been granted to the State 
Department in 1939, but the evolution of the war encouraged a change in authority. As 
investigations uncovered that “no less than seven hundred organizations in the United 
States were at work collecting funds and attempting to launch a relief program 
overseas,”5 President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought alternative measures to manage the 
aid organizations. As a result, the President’s Committee on War Relief Agencies was 
introduced on May 13, 1941. Although the State Department remained involved as a 
consultant, the President’s Committee took formal control of foreign-aimed relief. 
Headed by Joseph Davies, Fredrick Keppel, and Charles Taft, the group was experienced 
in both philanthropy and foreign affairs, and saw the importance of condensing the 
number of organizations providing aid.6  
 There also was an increasing emphasis on international organizations over local 
war relief. In 1940, Department of External Affairs had recognized the Canadian Red 
Cross Society as “Canada’s official voluntary aid society.”7 Canadian officials 
increasingly accentuated the importance of streamlining fundraising efforts. The 
President’s Committee studied the actions of the Canadian National Advisory Board and 
made similar conclusions supporting consolidation. It was with this last prospect in mind 
                                                        
      5. Wayne McMillen, “The War Relief Agencies,” Social Service Review 17, no. 3 (Sept. 1943): 
304; President’s Committee on War Relief Agencies, “Interim Report,” U.S. President’s War Relief 
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that each relief group was required to resubmit an application.8 The Committee sought to 
especially assess the efficiency and necessity of each group, but also likely the potential 
for subversiveness. As a consequence of these inquiries, the Krieghilfswerk attempted to 
reinvent its image in the months leading up to America’s entrance into the war.  
 As criticisms of the Kyffhäuser dated back to mid-1940, the group was required to 
overcome an extensive negative image for this new Committee. Newspaper articles 
portrayed the group’s fundraising efforts as celebrations of German victories abroad. The 
New York Times quoted two members of the League who said, “This affair [a gathering 
of the German-American Conference of Greater New York] is to demonstrate our love 
and devotion to the country of our birth. . .We do not have to hang our heads in shame. If 
the French of English were winning there would be fireworks in Times Square.” 9 The 
writer of the article seemed to draw attention to the most outspoken German Americans 
in attendance in order to question the loyalty of the ethnic community. Also emphasized 
in the article was the veterans’ status as first-generation immigrants from Germany. The 
event itself was a unifying experience for the German American community, as it 
assembled more than three hundred organizations in the area. But the publicity negatively 
affected the Kyffhäuser’s reputation rather than bringing the community closer together.  
 In response to the article, one concerned citizen further criticized the Kyffhäuser’s 
efforts. In a letter to the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, Ella Wylie wrote,  
 Such demonstrations are truly UNAMERICAN and should be looked  
 into. This is the sort of thing that paved the way for Hitler’s notions in  
 the smaller countries of Europe, and should be wiped out here. If these                                                          
 8. Merle Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 
1963), 432; 
      9. “Hitler’s Victories are Celebrated Here; 11,000 Aid Fund for Kin of Reich War Dead,” New 
York Times, May 20, 1940, p. 11, File 1, Kyffhäuser, Box 105, NARA. 
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 people are such admirers of Hitler and his scrupulous methods, let them  
 go over to Germany and help him win the war there. These people could  
 not truly believe in our Constitution or they would not uphold Hitler’s  
 aims and ambitions.10 
 
Wylie emphasized the importance of neutrality and her perception of the organization’s 
unpatriotic nature. Although such allegations were certainly not to the same extent as 
anti-German hysteria of World War II, this reaction demonstrated the rising tensions 
among the American populace. The State Department may not have taken Wylie’s 
complaints seriously in their more comprehensive registration of war relief agencies. But 
the President’s Committee was more likely to review these records and inquire into the 
group’s potential for seditious activity.  
 In hopes of overcoming their unfavorable image, the Krieghilfswerk revitalized 
its efforts to exude neutrality, morality, and forge positive relations with the public. In the 
organization’s resubmitted application, National Adjutant Walter Hachsler stated that the 
group intended to, above all, “uphold camaraderie” among the war veterans. The 
organization likely sought to portray a sense of unity and loyalty to which the larger 
populace could relate. Such an idea was complemented by their intention “to follow the 
century old tradition of German immigrants, to become good American citizens.”11 With 
assertions of patriotism and descriptions of historic legacy, the Kyffhäuser hoped to 
confirm their alliance with the American people. The report further established the need 
to “foster German Language and culture… and to uphold the good German reputation in 
this country.” Not only were Kyffhäuser members growing nervous of the accumulating 
tension within the United States, they believed it to be necessary to engage in public                                                         
      10. Ella Wylie to Cordell Hull, May 20, 1940, file 1, Kyffhäuser, Box 105, NARA. 
      11.  Water Hachsler to the Presiden’t Committee on War Relief Agencies, Explanation Sheet, May 
10, 1941, File 2, Kyffhäuser, Box 105, NARA, 2.  
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relation campaigns and reassert their political neutrality. At the same time, these actions 
also demonstrated a continuing emphasis on the culture and unity of the ethnic 
community.   
 In another newspaper, the Kyffhäuser was rather positively portrayed as an “anti-
Nazi” organization. Yet, in that same article, the veterans were wrongfully accused of 
interacting with the German Red Cross and became under investigation by the American 
Red Cross in Michigan. Conflicting opinions made it perceivably difficult discern the 
true intentions of the organization. When the State Department inquired into their 
activity, Karl Schumacher was quick to reassure the government that the Red Cross’s 
allegations were incorrect and that the group did not have ties to other German agencies 
abroad.12  Again, while the government took note of these accusations, the State 
Department did not act immediately on their suspicions, but instead left matters up to the 
President’s Committee on War Relief Agencies. 
 Oddly, as collection efforts ran strong into mid-1941, there seemed to be less 
inquiry directly into the group’s intentions. But while public criticism may have 
diminished, governmental action took its own toll on the organization. In June 1941, 
President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8785 in an effort to halt the transference of 
funds to foreign powers. EO 8785 established a licensing program with the Treasury 
Department for organizations seeking to transfer funds to belligerent countries. As 
Germany was included in this list, the Kyffhäuser’s interactions with the Berlin-based 
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Reichskriegerbund finally came under scrutiny.13 Based upon the stipulations of the 
Executive Order and an investigation by the President’s Committee, the Kyffhäuser’s 
funds were rather suddenly suspended by the federal government in July 1941 without 
much further information given to the group.14  
 Hearing of their troubles, Emil Auer immediately requested that any additional 
money raised by the Kyffhäuser be transferred to the American Aid for German War 
Prisoners, as both organizations had been pursuing similar causes. His September 
newsletter to American Aid donors detailed a meeting between the two groups in New 
York the month prior,  
 Am 30. August war Ihr Landesvorsitzender Gast des ‘Kyffhaeuser  
 Hilfwerkes’ [sic] und in einer sehr wertvollen Aussprache mit den  
 Herren in New York kotten eine Basis fuer eine gute Zusammenarbeit  
 gefunden werden….Leider sind seit Juni die Gelder des ‘Kyffhaeuser’  
 von der Regierung gesperrt worden, doch hoffen wir, dass dieser Tage  
 das Geld wieder frei geben wird. [On August 30, our regional chairman  
 was a guest of the ‘Kyffhaeser Hilfwerkes’ [sic] and had a very valuable 
 conversation with the gentlemen in New York, during which a good base  
 for cooperation was found….Unfortunately, the ‘Kyffhaeser’s’ money was  
 shut down by the government, but we hope that it will be given back to  
 them again soon].15   
 
When writing to the war relief’s supporters, Auer emphasizes the likelihood for future 
coordination between the two groups. Such an occurrence supports his efforts to align 
and unify with other organizations within the German American community. Although 
Auer expressed hope that the government will unfreeze the Krieghilfswerk’s accounts, he 
also attempted to absorb the group’s funds.  
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      14. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. to J. Edgar Hoover, December 15, 1941, File 3, Kyffhäuser, Box 104, 
NARA; Emil Auer, Report #3, American Aid for German War Prisoners, September 1941, POW Bulletin. 
      15. Auer, Report #3, September 1941, POW Bulletin.  
American Aid for German War Prisoners 
   
48 
 In a letter to the State Department, Auer simply stated that if the American Aid 
could take on the additional funding, there would be less stress on the organization from 
American Red Cross and YMCA.16 In response, the Division of Controls passed the 
inquiry to the Treasury Department’s Division of Foreign Fund Controls whose 
jurisdiction fell under EO 8785.17 It would appear that from a lack of reports specifying 
increased revenues and from the absence of any correspondence between the Treasury to 
State Department, Auer was not granted access to the funds he desired. 
 By October 1941, the President’s Committee and the State Department moved to 
unblock the Kyffhäuser’s assets. An amendment was made to the Krieghilfswerk’s 
registration limiting the organization’s aid solely to German prisoners of war and civilian 
internees in the United States, British Commonwealth, Russia, and any other country 
remaining free of German and Italian control.18 Despite such promising news, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was conducting its own examination of the organization. 
Although it was understood that the Kyffhäuser had followed protocol and ceased activity 
upon the issuance of Roosevelt’s Executive Order, the State Department discussed the 
possibility of prosecuting the war relief agency for illegal collaboration with the 
Reichskriegerbund.19 With suspicion as to whether the organization was in close 
association with the Nazi Party abroad, the Justice Department’s Special Defense Unit 
listed the Kyffhäuser Kriegshilfswerk as a “dangerous” organization and intended to keep 
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a close watch over their activity.20 The organization was accused of “aid[ing] German 
War Prisoners in Canada to escape to the U.S. and then to Mexico en route to 
Germany.”21 The combination of these investigations ensured that the group was under 
great scrutiny as tensions culminated in December.  
 Consequently, American entrance into the war was the final catalyst of the 
Kyffhäuser’s closure. When Germany became an official enemy of the United States in 
December 1941, the veterans understood the further inspection they would soon be under. 
Therefore, the Kyffhäuser, League of German War Veterans in U.S.A. was formally 
dissolved itself on February 1, 1942. Although all activities of the Krieghilfswerk were 
terminated at that time, FBI investigations into the organization’s members and activities 
continued through August of that year. Federal hearings of German American Bund 
leaders “for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act” also required examination of the 
Kyffhäuser’s ties to the Reichskriegerbund, although it is not clear whether those on trial 
were directly involved in the veterans association.22    
 In total, the Krieghilfswerk raised $140,000 in solicitations from German 
American organizations throughout the country.23 By the time the two groups had met 
together in August 1941, the American Aid group had raised nearly $13,000 in donations. 
Such figures put into perspective the lesser degree to which Auer’s organization raised 
funds. While the American aid was more of a local initiative formed out of his own                                                         
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vision, the Kyffhäuser had a preestablished veterans network to which to appeal. During 
its operation between late November 1939 and early February 1942, Kyffhäuser averaged 
approximately $5600 in donations each month. In contrast, the American Aid for German 
War Prisoners raised approximately $1300 in its first ten months of solicitation. 
 The discrepancy between these two fundraising entities serves to confirm the very 
line of reasoning employed by the President’s Committee on War Relief Agencies, “It is 
a well-established fact that competition in fund-raising enhances the problem of obtaining 
money even for the most appealing causes.”24 The existence of two organizations raising 
funds for the same purpose did not yield positive results for either group in their fourteen 
months of concurrent fundraising. Instead, their appeal to the German American 
community forced the donors to choose one of the organizations rather than unifying 
under a mutual cause. Although the Kyffhäuser called for its own dissolution, a 
combination of both suspicion and consolidation would have likely yielded the same 
results shortly. With the Kyffhäuser officially out of commission, Auer’s relief effort 
gained the ability to capture the full attention of the ethnic community.  
 When the Krieghilfswerk was under investigation in late 1941, Emil Auer had 
worried of a similar fate for his own organization. In newsletters shortly preceding 
American entrance into the Second World War, Auer constantly reaffirmed to his 
supporters the importance and validity of the relief effort. In September 1941, he wrote, 
“We wish to emphasize the fact that we still have full permission from the authorities to 
carry on with out work and we must beg you to do everything in your power to raise 
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additional funds.”25 Hoping to avoid the prospect of diminishing donations, and calling 
upon those who may have previously contributed to the Kyffhäuser’s funds, Auer sought 
to reassure the German American community of his sanction to proceed with war relief.  
 Furthermore, Auer repeatedly invoked a strong sense of pious duty to help those 
imprisoned by the war.26 The American Aid for German War Prisoners donated nearly 
five hundred catholic [sic] prayer books to the International Red Cross in Montreal, 
which were in turn distributed to both prisoners of war and internees in Canada.27 In his 
address to supporters and donors, Auer directly appealed to the Christian sympathies of 
the public,   
  
 The relief to all war prisoners is entirely neutral and consequently not an  
 expression of political support, but merely a gesture of christian [sic] and 
 human charity. . .Sons – who are loved at home, fathers – who cannot  
 forget their families, husbands – without news from home, all are awaiting  
 some sign that they are not forgotten. This is only possible through your 
 generosity.28  
 
Incorporating a religious tone to the organization likely allowed for a means of 
humanizing both the German Americans and the Axis soldiers alike. But most notably, it 
shifted focus away from political scrutiny of the cause to perceptions of more charitable 
intent. With potential for backlash from the government, Auer put stress on the 
philanthropic aspects of his efforts, as he likely thought it would understood to be of 
decent cause. His strong ties to the Quaker religion also likely played a motivating role in 
is pursuit of compassionate action. 
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 In December 1941, U.S. involvement in the war also changed the actions and 
outlook of the American Aid organization. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor, Auer immediately contacted the American Red Cross, seeking not only to 
provide further aid, but also to show American allegiance. Interestingly, Auer asked the 
National Chairman of the American Red Cross to send word to their German affiliates 
indicating, “All during the time that we have been working for the German War Prisoners 
we found the American government very cooperative. We are sure that this generosity on 
the part of the American government will be received with great satisfaction by the 
German Red Cross. In return will guarantee the same cooperation on the part of the 
German government.” 29 Although he likely wrote the Red Cross intending to 
demonstrate loyalty and cooperation, Auer’s reassurances might instead have drawn 
further scrutiny to the war relief group. His words seemed to indicate an agreement 
between the German Red Cross and the American Aid organization, which was not the 
case at the time, but would have likely aroused alarm.  
 His continuous reassertions of patriotism also likely contributed some degree of 
confusion towards the American Aid for German War Prisoners. Referring to Americans 
soldiers as “our boys…prisoners in the hands of our enemies,”30 his words might have 
been misunderstood to indicate the POWs he was aiding. Such an occurrence would have 
emphasized the group’s German ethnicity, while instead Auer saw himself and his 
supporters as “good Americans.”31 In response, the President’s Committee questioned the 
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organization’s intentions and ties to Germany, with Auer scrambling to explain the 
meaning of his words.32  
 Further reflecting the escalating tensions brought on by American’s participation 
in war, Auer requested an official name change of the organization in January 1942. In 
reply to the prospect of omitting the “German” distinction in the organization’s title, one 
State Department official wrote, “This conveys the erroneous impression that the money 
collected will go to aid American war prisoners when in fact most of the money will most 
likely still go to aid German war prisoners.”33 In support of alleviating such controversy, 
a proposal seeking the dissolution of the war relief group by was issued by the 
Department. Joseph Green counteracted these claims by citing the Geneva Convention 
(1929) as a justification for the continued presence of the humanitarian organization. 
Although Green did not necessarily support Auer’s cause, he understood the legal 
necessity of upholding international standards and domestic law, and admitted that the 
“necessary legal means do not now exist to bring to an end the American Aid for German 
War Prisoners. 34  
 Another official wrote that not only did he think that the relief efforts should be 
left up to larger, legitimized organizations, but also that the current conditions of warfare 
did not leave him in support of Auer’s efforts,  
 We’re in the midst of a war and I am not going to get too excited about  
 efforts on the part of persons in this country to give aid and comfort to  
 prisoners of our enemies…. In my opinion, it would be better if this  
 organization would dissolve. Their desire to change their name is an  
 indication of a similar thought in their own mind -- at least an indication                                                         
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  that they cannot continue along the lines intended in their original  
 organization.35  
 
Accordingly, American involvement in the war motivated the President’s Committee on 
War Relief Agencies and State Department to pursue a more rapid criticism and 
consolidation in comparison to that prior to the war.  
 Nonetheless, much like the Kyffhäuser’s shift in focus as the war progressed, the 
American Aid wished to extend relief to both Italian and American POWs imprisoned in 
all Axis-controlled countries worldwide.36 Although Joseph Green formally confirmed 
the name change of the organization, he specified that any war relief efforts aiding 
American soldiers were not included under the jurisdiction of the State Department and 
President’s Committee.37 At this point in time, it became even more evident that Auer’s 
desire of philanthropic expansion was not received well by the government. 
 In July 1942, the President’s War Relief Control Board (WRCB) assumed 
jurisdiction over the war relief efforts.38 This shift occurred under Executive Order 9205, 
as President Roosevelt established the Board as a replacement for the Committee.39 
Heading the WRCB were Joseph E. Davies, Charles P. Taft, and Charles Warren, both 
Davies and Warren have served on the President’s Committee on War Relief Agencies. 
The Board’s jurisdiction expanded to regulate and restrict relief organizations in the 
United States and abroad, extending to include those groups that aided refugees, civilians, 
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and members of the armed forces.40 The only organizations outside of the Board’s control 
were the Red Cross and religious groups that provided war relief.”41 
 Measures were also put in place to further consolidate the sheer number of 
philanthropic groups, as President’s Committee had effectively just begun the process. 
The Committee had taken an aggressive agenda and downsized the number of aid groups 
from seven hundred to three hundred by July 1942. One year later, the War Relief 
Control Board further merged the number to one hundred and sixty-six organizations. In 
1945, there would be only ninety foreign war relief organizations still in effect.42 With 
these new intentions at their origins in 1942, each humanitarian effort was expected to 
resubmit, once again, an application defining the purpose and prior involvement of the 
organization. With reassurances readily provided by Auer, it was understood that the 
American Aid for War Prisoners did not intend to proceed with subversive activities. 
Nonetheless, the Control Board’s commentary on the American Aid application provided 
an understanding of the WRCB’s initial perspective and its future intentions for 
consolidation, 
 [We wish to] Limit the registration of this organization to its original  
 purpose, i.e. aid and assistance to prisoners and internees of enemy  
 nationality. There is some question whether the public might not be misled  
 into believing that this organization, which is essentially one for the relief of 
 enemy nationals, is a general prisoners of war aid organization comparable 
 perhaps to the Prisoners Aid of the YMCA or the Red Cross if it is permitted 
 to solicit aid for American prisoners as well. There is nothing to indicate in  
 the record that the agency is other than a bona fide one but there is some  
 question whether mixed objectives in which in a case as this are desirable.43                                                         
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These assertions were directly in line with the commentary issued by the State 
Department and President’s Committee on War Relief Agencies in their exit report.44 
While government did not directly question the validity or intent of the American Aid for 
German War Prisoners, the WRCB was still weary of the effort’s expansion. And as the 
Board’s immediate task was to rapidly decrease the competition among the war relief 
groups, the future was questionable for this relief organization. 
 In August, Auer sought once again to amend his organization’s registration to 
formally provide aid to U.S. civilian internees.45 But the WRCB was not fully supportive 
of his new endeavors. Although the Kyffhäuser Krieghilfswerk no longer pursued the 
same cause, the Control Board came to favor larger organizations of international 
influence over small scale, local initiatives. With change at the forefront, August 1942 
marked the beginning of the decline of the American Aid for German War Prisoners. 
 It is apparent that the American ascent into war marked the beginning of a higher 
scrutiny of the Kyffhäuser Krieghilfswerk, the American Aid for German War Prisoners, 
and similar foreign relief efforts. Evolving policy under the U.S. Department of State, 
President’s Committee on War Relief Agencies, and President’s War Relief Control 
Board sought above all to consolidate war relief. Although the Kyffhäuser came under 
suspicion by the government and public, the dissolution supported continued neutrality 
among the German American community.  
 Scrutiny of the American Aid was in part due to its involvement in Axis relief, but 
instead also stemmed from desire to streamline war relief. This occurrence is an indicator                                                         
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of great significance, as it demonstrates a sentiment quite different than the blatant anti-
German hysteria of First World War. While previously, the government may have 
suppressed an organization that supported the German enemy of war, the WRCB did not 
as greatly emphasize the group’s ethnic ties. 
 Humanitarian aid became a compromise between German culture and American 
loyalty, as relief efforts unified the ethnic community. Both international decree and 
national law protected the existence of these relief organizations. With this in mind, Emil 
Auer pushed the limit of the WRCB in the later half of 1942. Although his attempts at 
expansion were ill fated, he nonetheless hoped to forge stronger bonds across German 
America and bring aid to those who were immediately affected by the perils of war. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
 
Dissolution and Aftermath 
 
 
 
 By October 1942, Emil Auer’s petition to provide aid to American internment 
camps had been supported by the President’s War Relief Control Board, but then 
subsequently denied.1 The Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, spoke of the government’s 
role in regulating and managing the welfare of civilian internees through the Justice 
Department’s efforts.2 He did not see it appropriate for a war relief organization to 
provide supplementary supplies. In reply, Auer emphasized that the group did not wish to 
collect monetary donations for the internees, but rather they hoped to simply donate the 
clothing supplies and machinery they had purchased.3 He also clarified that the American 
Aid for War Prisoners had not been required to report their domestic philanthropy to the 
State Department, but that they hoped to provide this “supplemental help” to the internees 
despite the new governmental jurisdiction of the Control Board.  
 The matter of internment relief was left unresolved for some time before again 
being addressed in January 1943. A month prior, Emil Auer visited Washington, D.C. 
and met both the International and American Red Cross, as well as the WRCB. Auer 
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described the experience as an “exchanging of views,”4 and spoke with Board member 
Homer Fox to discuss future prospects for the war relief. The meeting evidently went 
well, for Fox followed up with another member of the WRCB, Eldred Kuppinger, and 
defended Auer’s intention. He stated that the American Aid for War Prisoners solely 
intended to “transmit. . .voluntary contributions [and] assist. . .in the operation of a hobby 
shop established by the camp [Fort Lincoln, Nebraska], especially in the sale of articles 
made in that shop.”5 Consequently, the Board approved the American Aid to send relief 
to German American internees with the stipulation that monetary donations could not be 
elicited, instead allowing only contributed supplies. Auer’s ability to aid relief to the 
interned members of the ethnic community further supported the cause of German 
American unification.    
 As war escalated overseas in February 1943, the government issued General 
Order 20 “prohibit[ing] any payment, transfer or distribution of property in the process of 
administration by a person under judicial supervision or involved in any court or 
administrative action or proceeding, to or for the benefit of any person in any place under 
the control of an enemy country.”6 These new measures supported Bulletin #56 from the 
Board of Economic Warfare, which had disallowed individuals to send personal packages 
to Axis prisoners in late 1942.7 These changes in jurisdiction seemed to defy the basic 
measures of the Geneva Convention, outlined in Article 37, “Prisoners of war shall be                                                         
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authorized to receive individually postal parcels containing foodstuffs and other articles 
intended for consumption or clothing. The parcels shall be delivered to the addresses and 
a receipt given.”8 But as international aid organizations like the Red Cross and the War 
Prisoners’ Aid of the YMCA still contributed supplies to the POW camps, it was only 
individual philanthropy that were restricted, not full war relief itself.  
 Consequently, with relief measures being further limited as the conflict 
progressed, the American Aid for War Prisoners shifted its focus to support these two 
international agencies. Through the stipulations of the President’s War Relief Control 
Board, the WRCB was not allowed control over the Red Cross nor any religious 
organizations. With a greater likelihood of the contributions being delivered without 
reproach from the Board, Auer focused his efforts on the Canadian Red Cross and 
donated hundred of Catholic prayer books emphasize once more his interest in religious 
contributions. The American Aid organization furthered their collaboration with the War 
Prisoners’ Aid of the YMCA to ensure proper distribution of supplies in Canada. By 
November 1942, the organization’s distributions were confined solely to these 
intermediary groups and only engaged in separate relief through internment 
contributions.9 Not only was action of this kind a way to avoid mounting political 
criticism, but also a means of evade the growing scrutiny of the War Relief Control 
Board.  
 But humanitarian intentions could not protect the aid group from the ongoing 
troubles in Europe. While the WRCB did not immediately seek the closure of Auer’s 
organization, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York issued a “blocking order” on May                                                         
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27, 1943 that froze Auer’s personal assets alongside those in the American Aid 
accounts.10 Auer claimed the order stated, “There is reasonable cause to believe that you 
are a national of a foreign country designated in executive order #8389, as amended, and 
within the meaning of section 5 (b) of the Trading with the Enemy, as amended.”11 
Despite being a naturalized German American, the Federal Reserve categorized Auer as a 
foreign national and would not allow him carry on the war relief in spite of attempts to 
the correct the mistake. Auer complained to the WRCB that he was guaranteed rights as 
an American citizen, and that his liberties were violated through the blocking order.12 
 In response to hearing of such news from Auer, the chairman of the Canadian Red 
Cross cited the importance of preserving the right of relief organizations. E.L. Maag 
wrote, “The structure of the work carried on by the Red Cross Societies all over the world 
may be jeopardized, if any one nation would make an attempt to use these international 
agreements for their own benefits only, instead of applying the benefits on a mutual basis. 
Please do not fail to let me know, if this order is not revoked promptly.”13 The New York 
office of the War Prisoners’ Aid of the YMCA expressed similar sentiment, “Needless to 
say, I trust your appeal for release of your funds will succeed. War is war and as it 
proceeds things tighten up more and more, and so many folk who in reality are quite 
innocent and only eager to be of help come under suspicion or at least under current 
regulation.”14 These correspondences lent support and appreciation for Auer’s efforts, 
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which the War Relief Control Board took into consideration.15 Surprisingly, the State 
Department mustered concern over the negative publicity that could result from the 
blocking order. The Department wrote to the American Red Cross to ensure that the 
limits on Auer’s efforts would not be perceived poorly overseas. They were worried that 
the government’s action to limit aid to German POWs could affect the treatment of 
imprisoned American soldiers.16 With reassurances in hand, the President’s War Relief 
Control reached a decision. As it perceivably created more problems than positive 
impact, the tenure of the American Aid for War Prisoners was soon to come to a close. 
The final decision to revoke Auer’s permit was reached by the end of June 1943. 
 The WRCB was discontented with the Treasury Department, as they did not 
appreciate the decision to freeze Auer’s assets without any consultation. As a result, the 
two offices sat down to discuss their varying perspectives and the information they had 
collected. Through the Board’s writings, it is evident that Emil Auer was under FBI 
surveillance, separate even from investigations by the Federal Reserve Bank. The 
Treasury Department divulged that they had information confirming Auer’s membership 
in the Nazi Party and his participation in the Munich Putsch in 1923. They discovered 
that he had been associated with German American Bund’s National Chairman, Fritz 
Kuhn, before a disharmonious parting of ways caused Auer to form the Spring Garden 
Association in Buffalo.17 All of this same information would again surface in the 
denaturalization trials Auer sat in on as a witness towards the end of the war. 
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 The Board also cited incorrect information regarding the American Aid’s loose 
affiliation with Kyffhäuser Krieghilfswerk and misleadingly identified members of the 
American Aid as resident aliens. In light of these controversial assertions, the Board 
came to an immediate conclusion to disband the American Aid for War Prisoners, “On 
the face of this record, plus a continuing series of irregularities. . .there would seem to be 
no justification whatever for continuing the registration of the organization.”18  
 Although Auer’s distant ties to Nazism swayed the WRCB in its final decision, 
the Board was not forthcoming about the information they had gathered. Stating that, 
“publicity would serve no purpose,” they did not wish to officially declare the reasons for 
the disbandment. Instead, the Board explained to Auer that their decision was based on 
pursuits of consolidation, “In view of the fact that properly constituted organizations are 
already carrying on the activities to which you have been devoting your attention, it is not 
believed proper in the public interest to encourage parallel or competitive operations.”19 
Long-time efforts to terminate this relief agency had finally been achieved.  
 By June 1943, Emil Auer’s humanitarian services had formally come to a close. 
Through its three-year life span, the American Aid for German War Prisoners had raised 
nearly $50,000 and shipped 200,000 parcels worldwide.20 But while the group officially 
disbanded in mid-1943, Emil Auer did not immediately cease his pursuit of philanthropic 
action. He continued to receive packages from prisoners’ relatives, as German Americans 
hoped to continue communication with their imprisoned family members. Auer sought to 
become an intermediary operation with the intention of forwarding the parcels without                                                         
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pursing monetary collection.21 He even offered to pay delivery costs and further 
attempted an appeal to the humanity of the War Relief Control Board (WRCB) in 
allowing him to continue this small service, “As you know there are many near relatives 
over here, many brothers and sisters. . . .Everyone concerned would be very happy [for 
the shipping allowance].”22 Yet, the WRCB was steadfast in its decision, denying Auer’s 
request and believing that any further work by aid organization would be simply against 
“public interest. . .[and] encourage competition or duplication.”23 Not only were Auer’s 
desires in contradiction to the Board’s intentions, they challenged the stipulations of 
General Order 20, as POWs no longer were allowed to receive personal care packages.  
 While Auer did not succeed in continuing his efforts, the lifespan of war relief 
organization speaks to his successes. At the time of American entrance into the war, there 
were very few remaining organizations that provided war relief to the Axis countries. 
Emil Auer had stated in February 1942, “Besides the YMCA we are, at present, 
practically the only organization that is carrying on this work of bringing relief to 
German and Italian War Prisoners in all parts of the world.”24 Enforcing this claim, when 
the WRCB published its mid-year report in June 1943, the list of German-focused 
organizations indicated only one group in existence.25 As the American Aid for German 
War Prisoners was disbanded at the end of that month, it is likely that the report indicated 
its status as the only remaining independent group sending relief to the Germans. Only 
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larger organizations like the American Red Cross and Prisoners’ Aid of the YMCA were 
allowed further involvement afterwards. Therefore, it becomes somewhat astounding that 
this war relief initiative could survive for as long as it did, as most organizations of its 
kind were terminated long before 1943.  
 While Auer faced relative uncertainties after the closure of the American Aid for 
German War Prisoners, he was almost immediately thrown into an even more 
challenging situation. As the President’s War Relief Control Board had been advised that 
Emil Auer had long been under surveillance, presumably by the FBI, the Board’s report 
mentioned the “possible denaturalization of Mr. Auer, who is understood to be a 
naturalized citizen of German origin.” 26Although he was fortunate enough to personally 
avoid denaturalization, Auer was called upon in January 1944 to testify as a key defense 
witness in the federal hearings of former German-American Bund members. The claims 
against the eleven individuals on trial were: “Taking the citizenship oath with mental 
reservations and of retaining alliance to Germany. . .[and] establish[ing] the subversive 
nature of the Bund.”27 While they could not be criminally prosecuted, each individual 
was charged with disloyalty to the United State with a possible sentence of imprisonment 
and deportation. 
 During the trial, Auer’s alliance with the Nazi Party in his youth and his parting of 
ways with Fritz Kuhn were again touched upon. The hearings made headlines across the 
state as the persecution attempted to question Auer’s credibility. Photographs surfaced of 
him posing with the radical Ordungs-Dienst (Order Service), a group he allegedly                                                         
      26. “Memorandum to the Board: American Aid for War Prisoners,” President’s War Relief 
Control Board, June 26, 1943 and Memorandum,” President’s Board, June 26, 1943, File Revoked, 
American Aid, NARA; Report #7, American Aid, POW Bulletin, NYC Public Library.  
      27. “Trial of Buffalo Bundists Underway,” The Leader-Republican, January 16, 1944, p.3. 
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opposed. It was also determined that he never rose at a Bund meeting to publically 
declare intentions of dissent. But Auer’s controversial involvement in the hearings did 
not immediately determine the fate of the former Bund members. His testimony was only 
one part of a lengthy trial, as questioning of “subversiveness” and disloyalty spanned the 
remainder of the war. Auer at least survived the investigation and the hearings without 
assaults on his own denaturalization. At its conclusion in February 1945, seven of the 
eleven former Buffalo Bundsmen were acquitted, while four had their citizenships 
revoked.28   
 Following the conclusion of the trials and the end of the war, Auer’s pursuits 
included work with the Quaker Relief in Central Europe. His connection with this 
religious group conceivably influenced the course of his humanitarian efforts and 
complemented the pursuits of the ethnic community. But such efforts are also evident of 
the greater U.S. involvement post-war reconstruction.29 Memories of the American 
Quakers’ kind treatment in Germany after World War I also likely encouraged his 
involvement with the Society of Friends in the post-war years as he provided aid to foster 
parents in Germany.30 His endeavors led him to reconnect with ethnic heritage overseas, 
while continuing to forge those strong bonds within the German American community.  
 In the 1950s, Auer made the decision to move to Washington State with his wife, 
German-native Angela Selma Auer. Spurred by a fascination with “a picture he saw of 
Mt. Rainer during his childhood, he satisfied his desire to live near this mountain,” Auer                                                         
      28. “Auer Admits He Took Part In Munich Beer Hall Putsch,” Evening News, January 15, 1944, 
p.1; “11 Ex-Bundists Go On Trial,” Binghamton Press, November 23, 1943, 24; “Four Ex-Bundsmen Lose 
Citizenship As Court Cites Link With Nazis,” Morning Herald, February 21, 1945, p.1.  
      29. “Emil Auer,” Tacoma News Tribune, February 8, 1996, obit. sec; Tolzmann, Experience, 344-
345. 
      30. Emil Auer to Homer Fox, June 10, 1943, File Revoked, American Aid, NARA; “Society of 
Friends to Hear Three Speakers,” Niagara Falls Gazette, Niagara Falls, NY, May 10, 1947, p.4.  
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relocated his family to Tacoma in 1953. He went on to pursue his passion for stamp 
collecting and selling, often advertising his expertise in Popular Science and philatelic 
publications. Auer passed away in 1996, with his wife following three years later. His ties 
remained close to Germany as the majority of his living relatives remained overseas.31 
 Erika Plath, the young German American who had hoped to connect with her 
relatives in Canada’s POW camps, pursued a career in business following her 
involvement with the war relief initiative. Working with her sister, Klara Drake Plath, 
Erika Plath became the co-owner of a family restaurant in nearby Rensselaer, New 
York.32 She was so highly respected that she earned the distinction of Rensselaer 
Business and Professional Club Woman of the Year in 1986. Well known for her 
volunteer work in raising funds for the Rensselaer Girls Club, Plath was even made an 
honorary resident of the City of Rensselaer after having long lived in East Greenbush. 
Much like her involvement in the American Aid for German War Prisoners at such an 
early age, Plath’s charitable nature and passion for activism evidently remained present 
for years after the war.33  
 Only with the larger scope of personal impact can the American Aid be put into 
greater perspective. Although the President’s War Relief Control Board may have ended 
the expansive plans Auer sought for his organization, his relief strategies crossed 
generational differences and appealed to the larger ethnic community. Auer found ways 
of adapting to changes in policy by aligning himself with larger German American and                                                         
      31. Emil Auer,” Tacoma News Tribune, February 8, 1996, obit. sec.; “Angela Selma Auer,” 
Tacoma News Tribune, November 30, 1999, obit. sect.; Extra,” Popular Science 162, no. 1 (January 1953), 
79; “Different,” Stamps: A Weekly Magazine of Philately 31-32, (1940), 357. 
      32. “Klara Drake,” Daily Gazette, August 7, 2000, [n. pag].  
      33. “Rensselaer ‘Woman of the Year’ Named,” Albany Times Union, Albany, NY, March 5, 1986, 
[n. pag]. 
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philanthropic associations. His persistency allowed the initiative to exist far after others 
of its kind had been disbanded. Even as perceptions of Auer’s ties to the Nazi Party 
motivated the group’s dissolution, bureaucratic consolidation efforts also evidently 
played a role. While the government questioned the loyalty of the German American 
community, the American Aid for War Prisoners sought an outlet to express its conflicted 
position in society. The effects of this humanitarian action appeared to last long after the 
war, as both Auer and Plath pursued similar initiatives throughout the span of their 
lifetimes.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 Emil Auer’s wartime work raises a series of intriguing questions, the first being: 
Why was this organization allowed to exist, particularly in light of the anti-German 
sentiment experienced during World War I? Most apparent, the Second World War was 
born out of a different era and mindset than that of the First. The evolution of the German 
American identity impacted perceptions of Auer’s group and encouraged its relative 
acceptance. While the German American Bund stood as an example of radicalism, the 
majority of the ethnic community pursued more cultural outlets of expression. In this 
way, immigrants like Auer took on the role of the “good German-good American” who 
advocated international philanthropy.  
 While he had immigrated to the United States as a young adult, Auer’s adolescent 
years had created close ties to Germany. Erika Plath, too, was a first generation German 
American, but also was engrained in American culture at an early age. Auer had been 
exposed to American war relief in Germany after the First World War, and was further 
encouraged by his religious convictions. Plath was motivated to humanitarian action 
through her familial connections to the German prisoners of war. In these ways, their 
comparable, yet diverse, motivations allowed for a basis of unification. War relief 
similarly captured the interest and attention of other German Americans. Charitable 
efforts combined the desire to help those of like heritage and came to form a sense of 
community cohesiveness. Yet, these actions also attempted to uphold the American 
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tradition of humanitarian work, as many wished to emphasize their loyalty to the United 
States. 
 Furthermore, the Geneva Convention set into motion an international standard for 
the treatment of prisoners of war. The U.S. government acted to neutrally manage the 
relief efforts providing them aid. This shift in policy and organization presented the 
ability for nearly all types of relief groups to emerge at the start of the war. Likely with 
this in mind, the President’s War Relief Control Board intended to pursue later 
consolidation without particular discrimination against the German Americans. Since 
both the War Prisoners’ Aid of the YMCA and the Red Cross provide relief to the POWs, 
the American Aid could be understood simply as a duplicate cause, not an assault on 
ethnicity. Such an occurrence would therefore seem to create the grounds for dissolution. 
 But why had a similar decision not taken place earlier in the war? Potentially, the 
proper measures were not in place until American entrance into the conflict. Only then 
did the WRCB gain broader jurisdiction than that of previous agencies. Although many 
members of the State Department voiced their discontent of allowing aid to the Germans, 
it is certainly plausible that there simply was not the legal means to disband the group 
earlier. And perhaps, the government was actually convinced of Auer’s humanitarian 
intent through their numerous correspondences. 
 Interestingly, Emil Auer’s downfall was due in part to his lofty goals of 
philanthropic expansion. First beginning with German prisoners of war in Canada, the 
relief group extended to aid Italian prisoners. Soon including British Commonwealth 
camps worldwide, the organization hoped to send relief to U.S. troops abroad. Although 
planned as a display of American loyalty, Auer’s action effectively caused the 
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organization to come under higher scrutiny. Yet, his intention to provide aid to German 
American internees caused the greatest concern. While Auer had long engaged in 
unreported efforts of bringing aid to the internees, his pursuit of licensing undermined 
American Aid stability. The President’s Committee on War Relief Agencies warned 
foreign relief agencies “to refrain from making appeals for domestic relief and… not 
attempt to combine domestic work with foreign activity.”1 But Auer sought to expand his 
humanitarian scope to help Germans in the United States. The government felt that the 
organization was attempting to undermine its authority.  
 While these actions provoked the attention of the WRCB, the Federal Reserve 
also took notice. Freezing Auer’s assets in 1943, the Reserve met with the Board and 
revealed all they had learned about the organization, from connections with the 
Kyffhäuser Krieghilfswerk to Auer’s ties to Nazism. While these findings may have 
caused the final revocation of Auer’s relief permit, they were not confined solely to 
suspicion of the American Aid for German War Prisoners. Even earlier in the war, the 
President’s Committee took a practical approach to understanding war relief 
involvement, “The military and geo-political changes of the last two years [since the start 
of the war] or more are reflected emotionally among the racial groups of interest in this 
country and the volume of relief funds peaks and falls with the fortunes of war.”2 Seeing 
the American Aid as purely influenced by the passions of international politics, it was 
difficult to see past these barriers to the actual humanitarian cause. Although not 
intending to discriminate against German Americans themselves, the government 
agencies controlling war relief brought an end to local philanthropy.                                                           
      1. President’s Committee. “Interim Report.” [n. pag].  
      2. President’s Committee. “Interim Report,” 6. 
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 Nonetheless, throughout the early years of war, Auer’s organization made an 
impact both overseas and stateside. As one German prisoner of war in Suriname wrote to 
Auer, “Gott sei Dank besteht hier im Lager ein gesunder Optimismus and wir hoffen, 
dass die Welt nach der Vernichtung… endlich zur Vernunft und Einsicht kommen wird” 
[“Thank God there is a healthy outlook of optimism here in the camp that the world will 
finally come to reason and insight after the destruction”].3 The American Aid made 
possible this hope, spreading relief from the expansive prisoner of war camps to the 
regional internment facilities. Emil Auer forged cohesive connections within the ethnic 
community and conveyed the more humanistic nature of German American culture in 
light of the atrocities carried out in war. The group raised funds for a charitable cause, in 
spite of governmental bureaucracy and lingering prejudice.  
 The American Aid for German War Prisoners existed despite all reasons for it not 
to flourish. The organization allowed German Americans the opportunity to recapture the 
sense of ethnic identity that had long been prohibited of them in the United States. Most 
remarkably, humanitarian action provided many German Americans the opportunity to 
find a compromise between their German heritage and sense of loyalty to the United 
States.  
 
 
 
                                                        
      3. Karl Berghoff to Emil Auer, October 26, 1941, POW Bulletin. 
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